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THE ROLE OF “COMMERCIAL MORALITY” IN
TRADE SECRET DOCTRINE
Lynda J. Oswald*
The approaching anniversary of E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher is the
impetus for this exploration and evaluation of the role of “commercial morality” in trade secret
misappropriation doctrine. Christopher is the well-known industrial espionage case in which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that flying an airplane over an underconstruction manufacturing facility to take photos of briefly-but-inevitably exposed trade secrets
was an “improper means” of accessing a trade secret and was contrary to standards of “commercial morality.”
Commercial morality has played a significant but shifting role in trade secret law over the
past seven decades and has become an important part of the contemporary trade secret doctrine
lexicon, yet courts and commentators have not explored the meaning of this term. This study fills
that gap in the literature by analyzing the origins of the commercial morality doctrine and its
proper application in trade secret law. The development of U.S. commercial morality doctrine
breaks down into four distinct time periods that illustrate the evolution of the doctrine in trade
secret law over time, including the shift from the doctrine’s initial use as a way to justify nascent
trade secret law and its liability expansion to the doctrine’s modern equitable role in structuring
injunctive relief for misappropriation.
The analysis also shows that while courts invoke commercial morality when adjudicating
misappropriation claims, they do not define the meaning of the term or provide reasoned analysis
of its application. This is problematic when courts use the term in lieu of careful analysis of the
facts and reasoning underlying their decision. Explicit recognition of the equitable nature of
commercial morality doctrine would facilitate judicial application of the concept in a principled
and effective manner.
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INTRODUCTION
Milestone anniversaries often trigger reflection and analysis. The fiftieth
anniversary of E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher1 provides just such a
prompt to explore and evaluate the role of “commercial morality” in trade
secret misappropriation doctrine. Christopher is the well-known industrial
espionage case in which, as the court so colorfully phrased it, “an airplane
[was] the cloak and a camera the dagger.”2 In addressing the legality of flying an airplane over a partially constructed manufacturing facility to take
photos of the briefly-but-inevitably exposed trade secrets contained therein,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sought to draw a firm line in
the soft sand of trade secret doctrine by declaring such actions illegitimate.
It grounded its decision in the ill-defined constraints of “commercial morality,” asserting: “Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the
protections required to prevent another’s spying cost so much that the spirit
of inventiveness is dampened.”3

1 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
2 Id. at 1013.
3 Id. at 1016.

R
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Christopher is routinely featured in textbooks,4 scholarly commentary,5
and treatises,6 and generations of law and business students have debated the
outer boundaries of commercial misbehavior and trade secret misappropriation using the intriguing facts and compelling language of this surprisingly
short opinion. Modern technological developments allow for interesting
hypothetical twists, e.g., how might the use of unmanned drones or satellite
images from Google Earth change the outcome?
But what makes Christopher the landmark case that commentators suggest? Despite being half a century old, Christopher has been cited in a mere
sixty published court opinions.7 The bulk of these opinions address acquisition of trade secrets through “improper means”;8 indeed, Christopher is the
quintessential example of wrongful acquisition of trade secrets.9 In stark
contrast to this relative paucity of judicial attention, Christopher has been cited
4

These include, of course, law school textbooks. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYPATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 95 (8th ed. 2017); MARY
LAFRANCE, GARY MYERS, LEE ANN W. LOCKRIDGE & DAVID L. LANGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 320 (5th ed 2018); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, MICHAEL J. MADISON &
MARK P. MCKENNA, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1462 (5th ed. 2017); JAMES
CHARLES SMITH, EDWARD J. LARSON & JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (4th ed 2018). The case also appears in a number of non-law school textbooks.
See, e.g., FRANK A. SCHUBERT, INTRODUCTION TO LAW & THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (11th ed. 2015);
ELI M. NOAM, MANAGING MEDIA AND DIGITAL ORGANIZATIONS 241 (2018); ERIC L. RICHARDS
& SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 702
(2014); KURT M. SAUNDERS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION 46 (2016).
5 See, e.g., THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 120–21 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011); DAN
HUNTER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 185 (Dennis
Patterson ed., 2012); MAGDALENA KOLASA, TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY: IN
SEARCH OF AN EQUILIBRIUM 32 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2018); GARY MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 452 (3d ed. 2017); see also infra note 10 and accompanying
text (noting that there are over 250 law review articles that cite Christopher).
6 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 739 n.14, Westlaw (2d ed. database updated June 2020); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2:04[A][3] (5th ed. Supp. 2007); 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE
SECRETS LAW § 4:3, Westlaw (database updated April 2020); 3 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E.
BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 13.03[2][b] (2020); 1 DAVID W. QUINTO ET AL., TRADE
SECRETS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.03 (2020); 1 MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, COMPUTER CONTRACTS
§ 3A.02, LexisNexis (database updated 2020); 10 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE &
ALFRED W. GANS, 11 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 34:27, Westlaw (database updated Mach
2020).
7 A Lexis Advance Shepard’s search of decisions that have cited E.I. duPont deNemours
& Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), run on February 22, 2020, yielded sixty
cases.
8 Id. Forty of the sixty opinions address “improper means” of trade secret acquisition.
Id.
9 See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, Out of Thin Air: Trade Secrets, Cybersecurity, and the Wrongful Acquisition Tort, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 373, 390 (2018); William E. Hilton, Note,
What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropriation of a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287,
295–96 (1990); Harry Wingo, Note, Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret
RIGHT,
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over 250 times by law review commentators (and over 350 times in all by
secondary sources),10 and appears as a prominent example of trade secret
misappropriation through “improper means” of access in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.11 The significance of the case to scholarly analysis and understanding of trade secret
doctrine is revealed by the superlative terms commentators use to describe it:
“famous,”12 “[c]lassic,”13 “well-known,”14 “notable,”15 “celebrated,”16 “leading,”17 and “canonical.”18
The Christopher court also based its holding in part upon the amorphous
concept of “commercial morality.” This aspect of Christopher has received
decidedly less attention than its discussion of “improper means” of trade
secret misappropriation: its invocation of commercial morality has been cited
a mere thirteen times in court opinions.19 Yet, the term “commercial moralLaw, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 196 & n.9 (1997). No other case since has involved such
extraordinary facts, however. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
10 A Lexis Advance Shepard’s search of secondary sources that have cited Christopher,
run on February 22, 2020, revealed that Christopher has been cited over 250 times by law
review commentators and over 350 times in all by secondary sources.
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c, illus. 3 (AM. L. INST.
1995). See infra Section III.D.
12 4 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 6, § 15.01; Timothy T. Takahashi, The Rise of the
Drones—The Need for Comprehensive Federal Regulation of Robot Aircraft, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
63, 96 (2015); John R. Boulé III, Comment, Redefining Reality: Why Design Patent Protection
Should Expand to the Virtual World, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1113, 1123 n.55 (2017); Jessica L. Cole,
Note, Can You Keep a Secret? An Analysis of Methods Competitors Should Use to Protect Trade
Secrets Before Liability for Misappropriation Attaches, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 437, 442 (1999–2000).
13 Matthew J. Frankel, Secret Sabermetrics: Trade Secret Protection in the Baseball Analytics
Field, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 240, 253–54 (2012).
14 Brandon B. Cate, Note, Saforo & Associates, Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common Law Trade Secret
Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687, 712 (2000).
15 Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment,
49 IDEA 359, 363 n.7 (2009).
16 Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 630
n.30 (2013).
17 Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information,
116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1809 n.225 (2007).
18 Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation
Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1593 n.180 (2017).
19 See Sys. 4, Inc. v. Landis & Gyr, Inc., 8 F. App’x 196, 200 (4th Cir. 2001); Alcatel
USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 1999); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v.
Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1238 n.42 (8th Cir. 1994); Phillips v. Frey, 20
F.3d 623, 630 (5th Cir. 1994); GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG USA, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d
723, 739 n.20 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs Operations, Inc., No. 12-C-3229,
2013 WL 5587086, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2013); DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 79 (D.D.C. 2007); Q-Tech Lab’ys Pty Ltd. v. Walker, No. 01-RB-1458, 2002 WL
1331897, at *12 (D. Colo. June 4, 2002); Dreamers Candles, Ltd. v. Eli, No. 3:00-CV-2133-G,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10361, at *12 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2001); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v.
Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., No. 81-60-E, 1987 WL 341211, at *31 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 30, 1987);
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1366 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Pocahontas
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ity” had a long history in commentary and in general business law cases prior
to Christopher, including appearing in twenty-one trade secret cases in the
seventeen years preceding Christopher.20 Indeed, commercial morality has
played a significant, albeit shifting, role in trade secret doctrine over the past
seven decades and has become an important part of the contemporary trade
secret doctrine lexicon, yet courts and commentators have not explored the
meaning of this term. This study fills a gap in the literature by examining the
origins of the commercial morality doctrine and its proper application in
modern trade secret doctrine.
Part I provides a refresher on the provocative facts of Christopher and the
short but powerful opinion of the Fifth Circuit. Although we tend to perceive commercial morality notions as being closely linked to Christopher in
modern trade secret analysis, the concept has a long history in English and
American legal thought. Part II analyzes the origins and historical development of the commercial morality standard in business law. While commercial morality concerns can be traced to medieval England, commentators
seized upon the concept during the nineteenth century, galvanized by the
financial and commercial misdeeds flowing from the swelling business activity of the Industrial Revolution in both Britain and the United States. The
term appeared for the first time in U.S. caselaw in 1852 in a non-trade-secret
case and was followed by the use of the term in many other business law
settings over the next eight decades.
As Part III demonstrates, trade secret protection grew in importance at
the turn of the twentieth century, propelled by the twin engines of growth in
economic activity that outpaced regulation and growth in inventive activity
that exceeded patent law’s ability to adequately protect. Commercial morality first emerged in trade secret doctrine as a result of this increased activity.
The development of commercial morality doctrine in trade secret law breaks
down into four timespans: (1) from the emergence of the term in the trade
secret setting in 1939 in the Restatement of Torts to the decision in Christopher
(1938–1970); (2) from Christopher to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1970–1979); (3) from the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition (1980–1994); and (4) from the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition to the present. Part III traces the evolution of the commercial morality doctrine in trade secret law over time, including the shift
from its initial use as a way to justify nascent trade secret law to structuring
injunctive relief for misappropriation today.
Part IV considers the implications of commercial morality doctrine in
trade secret cases. Courts invoke commercial morality when adjudicating
misappropriation claims, but they do not define the meaning of the term or
provide reasoned analysis of its application. Nonetheless, commercial morality is an important concept in trade secret misappropriation doctrine because
Aerial Spray Servs., L.L.C v. Gallagher, No. 14-0690, 2015 WL 576161, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App.
Feb. 11, 2015); Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno Ltd., LLP, 421 S.W.3d 198, 213 (Tex.
App. 2013).
20 See infra notes 143–75 and accompanying text.
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it provides a means by which courts can shift the focus from the nature of the
alleged trade secret to the nature of the behavior of the defendant.21 Moreover, commercial morality operates in practice as a shorthand mechanism
allowing courts to exercise fairness between the parties. In that sense, the
term furthers very salient societal and legal objectives—ensuring that unethical business behavior is constrained and commercial standards maintained—
despite doing so in an ill-defined and seemingly ad hoc manner.
I. CLOAKS

AND

DAGGERS: E.I.

DUPONT DENEMOURS

& CO. V. CHRISTOPHER

E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher 22 is the quintessential example
of misappropriation of a trade secret through industrial espionage. An
“unknown third party” hired Rolfe and Gary Christopher to fly over a DuPont
chemical plant under construction in Beaumont, Texas, to take aerial photographs.23 The Christophers refused to reveal their client’s name, and so
DuPont sued them for trade secret misappropriation, claiming they had photographed a highly confidential and valuable unpatented process for producing methanol.24
The case came before the Fifth Circuit on diversity jurisdiction,25 where
the court had to apply Texas law in a case of first impression.26 The Christophers maintained that their actions were lawful as they had “conducted all of
their activities in public airspace, violated no government aviation standard,
did not breach any confidential relation, and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal conduct.”27 In the absence of illegal conduct or a contractual
breach, they contended, there could be no misappropriation of a trade
secret.28
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. While previous trade secrets had indeed
contained at least one of these elements of wrongful behavior, the court did
not believe that Texas law would limit trade secret misappropriation solely to
these instances. Rather, the Fifth Circuit noted, the Texas courts had
adopted section 757 of the Restatement of Torts, which prohibited acquisition
of a trade secret by “improper means,”29 defined, “[i]n general,” as “means
21 See Classic Instruments, Inc. v. VDO-Argo Instruments, Inc., 700 P.2d 677, 694 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985).
22 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
23 Id. at 1013.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1014.
26 Id. At the time, there was no federal law addressing trade secret misappropriation.
Cf. infra note 241 (discussing subsequent development of federal civil and criminal trade
secret causes of action).
27 Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1014.
28 Id.
29 See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
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which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality
and reasonable conduct.”30
This broader ban, the court found, constrained the defendants’ behavior while providing an additional layer of protection to trade secrets’ owners.
A trade secret owner might be required to build “ordinary fences and roofs”
to shield its secrets from prying eyes, the Christopher court opined, but it need
not “guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable
methods of espionage now available.”31 Here, DuPont had taken “reasonable” steps to conceal its secret32 and the Christophers’ efforts to obtain that
secret for a third party through aerial surveillance and photography were
manifestly improper within the meaning of section 757, regardless of
whether the actions were lawful under federal aviation regulations or not in
breach of contract.33
Christopher was a short opinion, but it provided the most complete analysis of “improper means” of trade secret access found in any court decision
before or since. It is difficult to argue with the stance taken by the court:
competition should be fierce but fair, and forcing a competitor to bear excessive costs to guard against underhanded espionage attempts by another does
not serve societal interests.
The discussion of “improper means” in Christopher was closely intertwined with a discussion of commercial morality. The Fifth Circuit noted the
difficulty of categorically defining “improper means” of accessing a competitor’s trade secrets, but emphasized that “our ethos has never given moral
sanction to piracy.”34 The court explained: “ ‘Improper’ will always be a word
of many nuances, determined by time, place, and circumstances. . . . Clearly,
however, one of its commandments does say ‘thou shall not appropriate a
trade secret through deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not reasonably available.’ ”35 In the court’s view, “[t]o
require DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished plant to guard its secret
would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school
boy’s trick.”36 The court positioned its decision squarely within concerns of
balancing the interests of free competition against the need for safeguarding
incentives for innovation: “[O]ur devotion to free wheeling industrial competition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the standard
of morality expected in our commercial relations.”37 Rather, “[o]ur tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections required to
30
INST.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. L.
1939) (discussed infra note 118 and accompanying text)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
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prevent another’s spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is
dampened.”38
The Christopher court supported its outcome by quoting the declaration
of the Supreme Court of Texas in a 1958 case that “the undoubted tendency
of the law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial
morality in the business world.”39 As will be discussed below,40 this language
actually originated in the Restatement of Torts in 1939. The language is problematic as it makes an assertion—that standards of commercial morality are
ever-increasing—that was unsupported by the drafters of the Restatement
when they wrote it, and by every court that has cited this statement in an
opinion since.41 Yet, the assertion has taken on a life of its own over the past
eighty years that permits courts unfettered discretion in reaching desired
outcomes.
Christopher is a classic exemplar of adroit judicial use of vocabulary to
reach an intended outcome. The behavior at issue in Christopher was shocking and viscerally unfair, and yet it was not illegal; it was “improper.” “Commercial morality” provided the necessary link to transmute that improper
conduct into liability-incurring behavior. In this particular instance, it provided a palatable rationale supporting the appellate court’s affirmation of the
trial court’s finding that DuPont had stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted.42
The term “commercial morality” was not coined by the Christopher court
in 1970, nor even by the Restatement in 1939. Rather, as the next Part
explores, the term had a long history in commentary (reaching back to the
Middle Ages in England) and U.S. caselaw (reaching back to 1852). Understanding that history is essential to understanding the development of commercial morality doctrine in U.S. jurisprudence.
II. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF “COMMERCIAL MORALITY”
IN BUSINESS LAW DOCTRINE
The antecedents of the term “commercial morality” are found in the
early years of English commerce, where notions of commercial honesty and
morality constrained the actions of industry and trade, enforced through
such varied mechanisms as trade customs, ecclesiastical discipline, royal
authority, or parliamentary enactments.43 Commercial morality was seen as a
rationale for imposing higher standards of behavior than mere trade practice
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1015 (quoting Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958)).
40 See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
42 After various proceedings on remand, the parties jointly moved for dismissal, which
was granted by the trial court on July 16, 1971, thus bringing the case to a close.
43 See W. CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE DURING
THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES 10 (London, Cambridge Univ. Press 1890). Cunningham
concluded: “New industrial abuses may have called forth new moral indignation, and some
industrial successes have done much to qualify moral judgments; but on the whole we may

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL103.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 9

5-NOV-20

“commercial morality” in trade secret doctrine

8:22

133

would prescribe, thus elevating the commercial climate.44 The concept was
catapulted to the fore by the rapid economic expansion and accompanying
striking financial failures and business scandals of the mid-nineteenth century, first in Britain and subsequently in the United States,45 causing the term
“commercial morality” to take firm hold in the legal lexicon.
A. Emergence of Commercial Morality Norms in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
In the mid-1800s, the creation and flourishing of limited liability companies led to a rapid growth in investment in financial assets in the British economy.46 This in turn led to significant financial participation by the middle
class for the first time, generating concerns about protection of less sophisticated investors.47 These concerns were exacerbated by neophyte investors
branching out beyond traditional and rather staid investments, such as government securities, to new, seemingly more speculative and less trustworthy
forms of commercial and industrial investments, both domestic and international.48 Indeed, the spectacular rise in financial assets and investment
opportunities during this time period was paralleled by equally spectacular
instances of fraud and investment failures.49 This led, as might be expected,
see that the current conviction in regard to the morality of certain transactions has greatly
affected the conduct of industry and trade in each succeeding generation.” Id.
44 See 2 THOMAS GISBORNE, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE DUTIES OF MEN IN THE HIGHER AND
MIDDLE CLASSES OF SOCIETY IN GREAT BRITAIN 212 (London, T. Cadell, 7th ed. 1824) (discussing the “innumerable evils” that would ensue from adopting “the custom of trade” “as
the general rule of commercial morality”).
45 See generally JANET HUNTER, ‘DEFICIENT IN COMMERCIAL MORALITY’? JAPAN IN GLOBAL
DEBATES ON BUSINESS ETHICS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES
9–35 (2016) (chapter entitled Credit, Speculation, Legislation, and Reputation: The Evolution of
the Discourse on Commercial Morality in England and Beyond).
46 See generally J.B. Jefferys, The Denomination and Character of Shares, 1855–1885, 16
ECON. HIST. REV. 45 (1946); Geoffrey Todd, Some Aspects of Joint Stock Companies,
1844–1900, 4 ECON. HIST. REV. 46 (1932).
47 See Michael Lobban, Commercial Morality and the Common Law: or, Paying the Price of
Fraud in the Later Nineteenth Century, in LEGITIMACY AND ILLEGITIMACY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW, LITERATURE AND HISTORY 119, 119–20 (Margot Finn, Michael Lobban & Jenny
Bourne Taylor eds., 2010) (noting a quadrupling of “serious holders of securities” between
1870–1900, reaching one million investors by the turn of the century).
48 Id. at 120–22.
49 See generally GEORGE ROBB, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IN MODERN ENGLAND: FINANCIAL
FRAUD AND BUSINESS MORALITY, 1845–1929, at 3 (1992) (arguing that the advent of the
joint stock company facilitated widespread financial fraud); COMMERCIAL MORALITY; OR,
THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES (London, Smith, Elder & Co. 1856) (arguing that insurance
companies, railway companies, and joint stock companies all exhibited low levels of commercial morality). An 1868 entry in The Chronicle lamented the difficulty of improving
commercial morality in a manner that would protect the middle classes from the dangers
of the joint-stock systems. Mr. Goschen on Commercial Morality, CHRONICLE, Feb. 15, 1868, at
155. Likewise, an 1868 editorial in The Economist attributed the “alleged” decline in English
commercial morality (which it laid squarely at the feet of the “middle class”) to the number
of “discreditable failures” in new business ventures. The Alleged Degeneration of England in
Commercial Morality, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1868, at 1. Interestingly, the editorial found that
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to increased efforts by legislators and commentators to address bad business
behavior,50 although there was little agreement as to where the line should
be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable trade actions,51 or how
much regulation of trade activity was warranted.52 By about 1880, however,
the courts had begun to create legal doctrines constraining some commercially questionable behaviors, such as rules that attempted to prevent promoters and directors from making private profits from the launch of new
companies, although many other types of morally ambiguous business behavhonesty in sales transactions or in paying debts was not a key test of the level of commercial
morality achieved by a country. Rather, commercial morality was best measured by the
degree of honesty displayed in exercising financial discretion, say, over investments. Id. at
2. The editorial asserted: “No nation can be said to have had its commercial morality
tested at all that has not attained a very high development of its credit system.” Id. This
made it impossible to compare England’s commercial morality to that of other less financially developed countries, such as France or Germany, or even to England of a couple of
decades prior, as the circumstances were very different. Id. at 2–3. Indeed, the editorial
concluded, the only fair comparison for England would be to the United States, and The
Economist concluded that England would not come out the loser in that comparison. Id.
While acknowledging that there had been some significant financial scandals in recent
years, the editorial attributed those to the fast-growing credit industry, and complacently
concluded that “England has stood the strain on her commercial morality better than we
had any right to expect; that the wonder is rather that we have had so few disgraceful
exposures in all these years, than that we have had so many.” Id. at 3.
50 See Lobban, supra note 47, at 119–20 (citing GEOFFREY RUSSELL SEARLE, MORALITY
AND THE MARKET IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN (1998); STEFAN COLLINI, PUBLIC MORALISTS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN BRITAIN, 1850–1930 (1991)). See generally BOYD
HILTON, THE AGE OF ATONEMENT: THE INFLUENCE OF EVANGELICALISM ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT, 1795–1865 (1988); ROBB, supra note 49; SEARLE, supra, at 97–104; S.F.
Van Oss, The ‘Limited-Company’ Craze, in 43 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A MONTHLY REVIEW,
JANUARY–JUNE, 1898, at 731, 744 (James Knowles ed., London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.
1898) (lamenting how limited liability companies had lowered the standard of commercial
morality); James Taylor, Commercial Fraud and Public Men in Victorian Britain, 78 HIST. RSCH.
230 (2005) (examining the impact of the British Banks scandal on the reputations of the
public figures involved).
51 See Margot Finn, Michael Lobban & Jenny Bourne Taylor, Introduction: Spurious
Issues, in LEGITIMACY AND ILLEGITIMACY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW, LITERATURE AND HISTORY, supra note 47, at 1, 18 (noting that bankruptcy, for example, was not considered a
“social failure”).
52 Lobban, supra note 47, at 121; see also Sarah Wilson, Law, Morality and Regulation:
Victorian Experiences of Financial Crime, 46 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 1073, 1084 (2006) (“Many
parameters of ‘acceptable’ conduct in business did not become apparent until at least the
end of the nineteenth century and, in some cases, they remain unclear today.”). An 1855
article in The Economist laid the blame for low commercial morality at the feet of the law:
“[P]rofessional men hold fast . . . by the laws made in an age of less moral enlightenment
than the present. Their minds are fashioned in part by the false principles of the law, and
by them they are continually led to defend what is morally and commercially wrong.” The
Morality of Trade and of Law, ECONOMIST, June 23, 1855, at 672. The same article asserted
that commercial morality was lower in the United States than in England since the “leastinformed classes” of Europe immigrated to the United States, resulting in “low level[s]” of
American morality and political principles. Id.
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ior went unregulated under the law, subject only to social or moral
opprobrium.53
Similarly, industrialization in the United States led to growing discourse
on business ethics and to increased regulation of commercial activity, particularly at the state level.54 In the early nineteenth century, much of this concern was reflected in legislative attempts to shield the public from the
deleterious effects of unregulated commerce and trade and to promote
“quality, merchantability, and fair dealing” in the buying and selling of
goods.55 As the country developed throughout the nineteenth century, new
legal doctrines, such as limited liability provisions, emerged that were
intended to protect passive investors in the large-scale business firms fostered
by the nation’s rapid industrialization.56 However, law was not seen as the
panacea for all such commercial woes. Rather, principles of commercial
morality were viewed as playing an important role in the orderly transaction
of business “without resort to law or arbitration.”57
Several commentators of the period examined issues of commercial
morality and business honesty, generally concluding that American standards
of business behavior left much to be desired. For example, an 1890 Harvard
Law Review article analyzed the then-nascent rules in “ ‘cases analogous to
trademarks,’—trade-names, trade-signs, the good-will of a business, etc.,”58
and decried the “proverbially low” state of American “commercial honesty.”59
The author concluded that American legal rules lagged those of France,
where “commercial morality [was] high, and the rules as to unfair rivalry in
trade . . . strict.”60 Henry A. Wise Wood’s 1908 book, Money Hunger, likewise
condemned the lax standards of commercial morality that accompanied the
rapid growth of business capital at the turn of the twentieth century, ascribing it to the “heterogenous” nature of American society,61 which meant, in
Wood’s view, that there was “no established and universally accepted code of
correct business behavior”—merely a spectrum lying between “the extremes
53 See Lobban, supra note 47, at 131–33.
54 See HUNTER, supra note 45, at 19–22 (summarizing U.S. public discourse on business
ethics in the late nineteenth century). Federal regulation of such activities was rare in this
time period. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1196 (1986).
55 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 90 (1996).
56 DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER
4–8 (2002).
57 Commercial Morality, 40 HUNT’S MERCHS.’ MAG. & COM. REV. 644, 644 (1859).
58 Grafton Dulany Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV.
321, 323 (1890).
59 Id. at 332.
60 Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals also lauded the French standard of commercial
morality in Probasco v. Bouyon. 1 Mo. App. 241, 245 (Ct. App. 1876) (“In no country, perhaps, is the rule of commercial morality stricter than in France.”).
61 HENRY A. WISE WOOD, MONEY HUNGER: A BRIEF STUDY OF COMMERCIAL IMMORALITY
IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1908).
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of acknowledged theft and indubitable honesty.”62 Famed professor John H.
Wigmore analyzed the relationship between commercial morality and justice
in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1914 decision in L.E. Waterman
Co. v. Modern Pen Co.,63 a prominent passing-off case. He argued that “the
underlying bulk of law’s content is morality, on which law is superimposed,”
and lamented the retreat of judges from consideration of commercial morality in business disputes.64
The discussion of commercial morality in early formulations of trade
behavior norms in both America and England was significantly influenced by
religious commentators. Orville Dewey, a prominent American Unitarian
minister, for example, discussed commercial morality in several contexts in
his 1838 tome, Moral Views of Commerce, Society, and Politics, in Twelve Discourses,65 where he reflected on the “moral laws” that ought to apply to such
trade topics as contracts and bankruptcy. In particular, he discussed the
moral impact of using superior information to gain commercial advantage, a
topic related to modern trade secret law.66 Dewey concluded that it would
be “advantageous to commerce, and encouraging to human industry and
ingenuity” that a merchant be allowed to act on and benefit from superior
information that results from “superior talent, energy, and ingenuity,”
although the merchant should not pursue these ensuing advantages “beyond
the bounds of reason and justice.”67 Thus, Dewey argued, if two manufacturers are engaged in the same field and one makes valuable discoveries as a
result of his “attention and ingenuity,” he is not obliged to share those discoveries with his “indolent [and] dull” competitor.68 Dewey’s analysis displayed
the early seeds of the types of business and behavioral norms that would soon
arise in the yet-to-be-developed trade secret field.
Across the Atlantic, the Christian Social Union, a social gospel organization associated with the Church of England, issued in 1893 an internal monograph stemming from its conference on “commercial morality” in which the
members condemned practices such as adulteration of goods, false or misleading statements about the quality of goods, and deceptive and predatory
pricing practices.69 In 1905, two members expounded further on the nature
62 Id. at 2.
63 235 U.S. 88 (1914).
64 John H. Wigmore, Justice, Commercial Morality, and the Federal Supreme Court; The
Waterman Pen Case, 10 ILL. L. REV. 178, 187 (1915).
65 ORVILLE DEWEY, MORAL VIEWS OF COMMERCE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS: IN TWELVE DISCOURSES (London, Palmer & Clayton 1838).
66 Id. at 34.
67 Id. at 39.
68 Id.
69 CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION, CONFERENCE ON COMMERCIAL MORALITY (London, n.p.
1893). The Christian Social Union began in 1889 and merged with the Industrial Christian Fellowship in 1919; its goal was to “spread interest and information among Church
people, and thus to educate a body of definite opinion upon practical issues . . . .” Id. See
generally K.S. INGLIS, CHURCHES AND THE WORKING CLASSES IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 250–322
(1963).
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of commercial morality and its impact on both the consuming public and
traders in a second monograph, concluding: “It would be fatal to moral progress, and the complete negation of Christian obligations, if individuals were
to be allowed to be false to the witness of their own consciences, and to conform to what they knew to be dishonest practices, simply because it was
customary.”70
B. The Debut of “Commercial Morality” in U.S. Caselaw
It took a few decades for discussions of commercial morality to work
their way into U.S. caselaw. The earliest reported U.S. case to employ the
term “commercial morality” was Carrington v. The Ann C. Pratt, decided in
1852. This was not a trade secret case; rather, the dispute involved repairs
made when a ship was blown off course.71 The court noted that inflating
repair bills so as to over collect from insurance companies might have been a
common practice in the industry but “a proper regard to the best interests of
fair and honest trade as well as a due respect for commercial morality” meant
the practice could not be judicially sanctioned.72
The term “commercial morality” was invoked in thirty-two opinions
between the decision in The Ann C. Pratt in 1852 (where “commercial morality” made its first appearance in U.S. caselaw) and the issuance of chapter 36
of the Restatement of Torts in 1939 (where “commercial morality” made its first
appearance in trade secret doctrine).73 These thirty-two cases encompassed
an eclectic selection of subject matter, including trademark infringement,74
palming off,75 fraudulent misrepresentation,76 surety,77 breach of contract,78
and composition actions.79 “Commercial morality” was a fluid and often
undefined term in these early cases, with many courts providing only a glanc70 H.S. HOLLAND & J. CARTER, COMMERCIAL MORALITY 8 (1905). See generally Canon Hay
Aitken, Commercial Morality, 1906 QUIVER 424 (discussing role of Christianity in ensuring
commercial morality).
71 5 F. Cas. 150, 151 (D. Me. 1852) (No. 2445).
72 Id. at 153.
73 A Lexis Advance search for “commercial morality” in all federal and state cases
between January 1, 1852, and December 31, 1938, run on February 2, 2020, yielded thirtytwo cases.
74 See, e.g., Enter. Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 124 F. 923, 924 (C.C.D. Conn.
1903); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 651 (C.C.D. Del. 1899).
75 See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir.
1941); Hagan & Dodd Co. v. Rigbers, 57 S.E. 970, 970 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).
76 See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 225 N.Y.S. 488, 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927).
77 See, e.g., Cooper v. De Mainville, 27 P. 86, 86 (Colo. App. 1891); State v. Peck, 53 Me.
284, 287 (1865).
78 See, e.g., Lagerloef Trading Co. v. Am. Paper Prods. Co., 291 F. 947, 950 (7th Cir.
1923).
79 See, e.g., Brown v. Everett-Ridley-Ragan Co., 36 S.E. 813, 815 (Ga. 1900); Gilmour v.
Thompson, 49 How. Pr. 198, 198 (N.Y. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1875). None of the thirty-two
cases involved trade secrets; the term would not be used in that context until 1953. See
infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text (discussing Franke).
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ing reference to the role of commercial morality in resolving the dispute
before the court. Thus, early cases contained bromides such as: “The courts
are constantly endeavoring to uphold and enforce commercial morality, and
afford protection to honest enterprise and skill.”80
Indeed, only one of these thirty-two opinions inquired into the relationship between commercial morality and legal doctrine in any significant
detail. A 1923 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
ruling for the seller in a case involving a contractual repudiation by a buyer,
asserted: “[T]he law should not be regarded as crystallized strata of a dead
past, but as a living force that pulses in response to preponderant convictions
of morality. Commercial law should reflect commercial morality.”81 The
court noted that commercial morality was being advanced by “[a]ssociations
of commerce, leagues of advertisers, and of advertising publishers, courts of
equity developing rules of fair trade, and the people through their representatives in Congress setting up a commission to promote and emphasize commercial morality in a broader sweep than is possible for courts.”82 It then
rendered its decision in aphoristic tones: “Repudiators of fair and solemn
and binding promises are commercial sinners.”83
The amorphous nature of commercial morality made it a useful judicial
tool, particularly for those courts that wanted to justify outcomes perhaps not
entirely supported by precedent. For example, the Maine high court
rejected the defendants’ challenge of a jury verdict against them, stating: “If
there are cases that militate against the views here expressed, we are satisfied
that they savor more of the growing looseness of commercial morality than of
adherence to wholesome legal principles.”84 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit explained its holding in a bankruptcy case by stating: “We
80 Enter. Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 124 F. 923, 927 (C.C.D. Conn. 1903). See,
e.g., Ex parte Barnes, 4 So. 769, 770 (Ala. 1888) (“Sound commercial morality forbids that
all the advantages shall inure in one direction, while nothing but losses are entailed in the
other.”); N.Y. Life Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Baker, 59 N.E. 257, 260 (N.Y. 1901) (“The ruling of the
learned referee is not calculated . . . to promote common honesty or commercial morality
on the part of the beneficiaries of a trust when dealing with their trustee.”). Some courts
cited to English law, including an 1896 English passing-off case, Reddaway v. Banham,
[1896] A.C. 199, 209, in which Lord Herschell had stated: “I should regret to find that the
law was powerless to enforce the most elementary principles of commercial morality.” See,
e.g., Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 660–61 (C.C.D. Del. 1899); Hagan
& Dodd Co., 57 S.E. at 971; see also Clark v. Dunham Lumber Co., 5 S.E. 560, 561 (Ala.
1889) (citing Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (KB)) (stating that Pasley set
forth fraudulent representation doctrine “based on broad principles of honesty and commercial morality”).
Commentators too were raising concerns of “commercial morality” and “ethics” in the
emerging contexts of unfair competition and trademark infringement doctrine. See, e.g.,
Unfair Competition: Necessity for Actual Competition, 38 HARV. L. REV. 370, 370 (1925); Myron
W. Watkins, The Change in Trust Policy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 815, 832 (1922).
81 Lagerloef Trading Co., 291 F. at 956.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 State v. Peck, 53 Me. 284, 299 (1865).
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believe this is what the Congress intended, and with the more confidence
because it tends to enforce that open dealing which is the essential basis of
commercial morality.”85 The intermediate appellate court in New York used
the concept to validate new legal doctrine in a fraudulent misrepresentation
case:
It may be that this holding extends the content of what has thus far been
defined as actionable deceit. If this be so, we think the extension is based
upon a proper commercial morality and the logical import of the precedents that the purpose of the law is, wherever possible, to afford a remedy to
defeat fraud.86

However, the New Jersey Chancery Court declined to use commercial morality as a justification for expanding doctrine or remedies in the course of
determining whether a voluntary boycott by workers should be enjoined:
“Communities where men are guided in their dealings in the market by
unscientific, impolitic, or immoral principles are bound to suffer as compared with communities where correct and liberal principles are recognized
as controlling in business affairs.”87 The court concluded: “Courts of equity
do not attempt to enforce the Golden Rule, or even sound principles of commercial morality or expediency, by the writ of injunction.”88
In short, “commercial morality” took root in the legal lexicon as a way to
curb bad business behavior in an era in which the courts and legislatures
were still struggling to develop legal rules suitable for a burgeoning economy
and a business climate that was rapidly become sophisticated and complex.
Although “commercial morality” lacked a clear theoretical underpinning, it
was a convenient gap filler for business law doctrine that was still in its
infancy.
III. EMERGENCE

AND

EVOLUTION OF “COMMERCIAL MORALITY”
TRADE SECRET LAW

IN

U.S.

At the same time that commentators and courts were starting to infuse
commercial morality notions into the evolving business law sector, patent law
was proving insufficient to address the unprecedented innovation growth
spawned by the Industrial Revolution.89 Trade secret law began to emerge as
an alternative mechanism for protecting ideas and inventions.90 Although
85 Brigman v. Covington, 219 F. 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1915).
86 Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 222 A.D. 181, 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927); see also Bean
v. Brookmire, 2 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1873) (No. 1170) (“The rules of law
respecting the good faith to be observed by all who unite in a composition agreement are
well known and well settled, and rest upon the soundest policy and upon the clearest principles of equity, commercial morality, and fair dealing.”).
87 Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 65 A. 226, 231 (N.J. Ch. 1906).
88 Id.
89 See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2017).
90 Id. at 11 (citing Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 247 (1998)). Although traditionally trade secret law is
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the first trade secret cases were decided in the early 1800s,91 it took several
decades for a cohesive body of American trade secret doctrine to develop.92
The collision of these two economic developments—a rapid growth in un- or
under-regulated business activities coupled with an unprecedented increase
in innovation that the existing patent law system was unable to adequately
protect—created an environment in which concerns about appropriate commercial behavior and standards of business morality garnered significant and
increasing attention from society, courts, and policymakers.
The term “commercial morality” first appeared in a published trade
secret opinion in 1953, a full century after it first appeared in U.S. caselaw in
The Ann C. Pratt. Despite its late start in the trade secret setting, “commercial
morality” is mentioned today in more trade secret cases than in any other
area of law. Of the 266 federal and state opinions that have employed the
term “commercial morality,”93 123 involved trade secrets.94 The second largest category of cases involved more general unfair competition actions,95
traced back to Roman law, see 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 1:3; A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets
and the Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (1930), recent
scholars have argued that this subfield of law is more clearly related to the complex issues
arising out of the Industrial Revolution. See Bone, supra, at 251–60. See generally Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 19 (1996).
Certainly, early treatises on U.S. law did not discuss trade secret law. Kent’s well-known
1827 Commentaries on American Law, for example, had no language that would suggest a
duty, contractual or arising out of any duty of confidence between employees and employers, agents and principals, or other parties in a special relation, to maintain trade secrecy,
although he did describe the early status of patent and copyright law in significant detail. 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *299–305 (patent law), *306–15 (copyright)
(New York, O. Halsted 1827). This discussion arose in the context of personal property
acquired through “intellectual labour.” Id. at 298. Even the tenth edition of his treatise,
issued in 1860, did not address trade secret law.
91 The first English cause of action for trade secrets was in 1817. See Newberry v. James
(1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011; 2 Mer. 446. The first American case was in 1837. See Vickery v.
Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837). See generally William B. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade
Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 507, 507–15 (1939) (tracing early development of American and
English law on trade secrets). Some scholars consider Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452
(1868), which was the first American trade secret case to issue an injunction, to be the
leading early American trade secret case. See, e.g., 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 2:3; Bone, supra
note 90, at 252–59.
92 Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment,
and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 450–88 (2001);
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
311, 315–16 (2008); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn
from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 673–77; Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution
of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 498–502 (2010).
93 A Lexis Advance search for “commercial morality” in all federal and state cases, run on
February 2, 2020, yielded 266 opinions.
94 A Lexis Advance search for “trade secret!” and “commercial morality” in all federal and
state cases, run on February 2, 2020, yielded 123 opinions.
95 See, e.g., Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 365–66 (3d Cir. 2016);
Wilson v. Electro Marine Sys., Inc., 915 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1990); Yale & Towne Mfg.
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often paired with trademark infringement96 or palming off actions,97 where
the courts often resorted to vague statements of the flexibility and elasticity of
unfair competition as it responded to evolving (and presumably stricter)
notions of moral business behavior.98 The term also appeared in several
bankruptcy and composition cases,99 as well as a broad and seemingly unrelated variety of other settings, such as contract law,100 securities actions,101
malicious prosecution,102 and surety cases,103 typically on an occasional or
even one-off basis.
As this Part will illustrate, the evolutionary path and body of caselaw
addressing commercial morality in the trade secret arena divides naturally
into four distinct time periods. The first is from the introduction of the term
in the Restatement of Torts in 1939 to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Christopher
in 1970. This time period sees the emergence of the notion of “improper
means” of accessing trade secrets and, in 1953, the introduction of “commerCo. v. Ford, 203 F. 707, 707–08 (3d Cir. 1913); Fedders Corp. v. Elite Classics, 268 F. Supp.
2d 1051, 1057 (S.D. Ill. 2003). Roughly one-third of the cases raise unfair competition
claims. I say “more general” because trade secret law is considered a subset of unfair competition by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and by many courts and commentators. See, e.g., RIDSDALE ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS, at iii & § 1 (1953).
96 See, e.g., Tigrett Indus., Inc. v. Top Value Enters., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 313, 313 (W.D.
Tenn. 1963); Atl. Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Publ’g Co., 197 F. Supp. 524, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Lininger v. Desert Lodge, 160 P.2d 761, 762–63 (Ariz. 1945).
97 See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir.
1941); KJ Korea, Inc. v. Health Korea, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2014); CarFreshner Corp. v. Marlenn Prods. Co., 183. F Supp. 20, 22 (D. Md. 1960). Many of these
cases originate in New Jersey. See, e.g., Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Braintree Lab’ys, Inc., 38 F.
Supp. 3d 169, 182 (D. Mass. 2014) (applying New Jersey law); Duffy v. Charles Schwab &
Co., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (D.N.J. 2000) (applying New Jersey law); Ryan v. Carmona Bolen Home for Funerals, 775 A.2d 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
98 E.g., the courts often quote language from Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., in
stating that the concept of unfair competition “is as flexible and elastic as the evolving
standards of commercial morality demand.” 123 F. Supp. 2d at 815 (quoting N.J. Optometric Ass’n v. Hillman-Kohan Eyeglasses, Inc., 365 A.2d 956, 965 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976) (quotation marks omitted)). See, e.g., Aetrex Worldwide, Inc. v. Sourcing for You,
Ltd., No. 13-CV-1943, 2013 WL 1680258, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2013); Piquante Brands
Int’l, Ltd. v. Chloe Foods Corp., No. 3:08-CV-4248, 2009 WL 1687484, at *4 (D.N.J. 2009).
99 See, e.g., Brigman v. Covington, 219 F. 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1915) (bankruptcy); In re
Clark Ent. Grp. Inc., 183 B.R. 73, 80 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (bankruptcy); Singer v. Dondis,
178 A. 419, 419–20 (Me. 1935) (composition); Brown v. Everett-Ridley-Ragan Co., 36 S.E.
813, 815–17 (Ga. 1900) (composition). The term arises in a number of more modern
cases as a result of their citation to an influential article by Robert Weisberg. Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986). See, e.g., In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2007); In re Dehon,
Inc., 327 B.R. 38, 63 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
100 See, e.g., Schultze v. Chevron Oil Co., 579 F.2d 776, 781 (3d Cir. 1978); Potts v.
Thompson, 161 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
101 See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Cent. Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989,
994 (5th Cir. 1969); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
102 See, e.g., Potter v. Seale, 5 Cal. 410, 411 (1855).
103 See, e.g., State v. Peck, 53 Me. 284, 287, 299 (1865).
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cial morality” into trade secret caselaw. The second time period embraces
the eight years between Christopher and two key events in 1979 that redefined
trade secret doctrine: the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which omitted coverage of trade secret doctrine, and the promulgation of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). The third period covers the interim
time span from these two events to the introduction of the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition in 1994, which reintroduced trade secret law under the
unfair competition umbrella. Finally, in the post-Restatement (Third) era, we
see a surge in the use of “commercial morality” vocabulary in addressing
injunctive relief in trade secret disputes. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution
of commercial morality trade secrets from 1953 through 2019.
FIGURE 1:
NUMBER OF TRADE SECRET CASES REFERENCING
“COMMERCIAL MORALITY,” 1953–2019
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A. 1939–1970: The Emergence of “Commercial Morality” in Trade Secret Law
Although the courts were importing notions of commercial morality into
business law opinions by the turn of the twentieth century,104 the vocabulary
used to describe such concerns had not yet crystallized and the courts not
only did not use the term “commercial morality,” they often did not invoke
language of trade secrets or misappropriation either. The 1908 case of Eastern Extracting Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co., for example,105 was an
early precursor of the type of improper behavior at issue in Christopher. The
defendant, “disguised as a laborer,” secured employment at the plaintiff’s
plant.106 Two days later, having observed the plaintiff’s secret process for
extracting alcohol from emptied whiskey barrels, the defendant left, without
104 According to a Lexis Advance search run on February 2, 2020, for “commercial morality” in all federal and state cases, there were seventeen published state and federal cases
referencing “commercial morality” between July 1, 1852, and December 31, 1900. See, e.g.,
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 661 (C.C.D. Del. 1899); Clark v. Dunham Lumber Co., 5 So. 560, 561 (Ala. 1889) (fraudulent misrepresentation); Peck, 53 Me.
at 299 (surety); Gilmour v. Thompson, 49 How. Pr. 198, 199 (N.Y. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1875)
(composition agreement).
105 110 N.Y.S. 738 (App. Div. 1908).
106 Id. at 740.
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even bothering to collect his wages.107 He then formed a new company with
business associates and implemented the same process. In granting the
plaintiff’s request for an injunction, the court opined: “[M]ethods, such as
were used by [the defendant], are wrongful. They are dishonest, and cannot
be countenanced.”108 The court went on to explain: “Fair competition is
always encouraged; but a man cannot, through deceit and by means of an
appeal for employment as a laborer and assistance to earn his bread, enter
the household of his benefactor and steal his belongings.”109 The court did
not couch the claim in terms of trade secret misappropriation, however, nor
did it use the term “commercial morality.” Similarly, Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
American Can Co., a 1907 case, addressed the importance of requiring equitable conduct in the trade secret arena: “[T]oo much emphasis has perhaps
been placed upon the element of absolute secrecy in the process, and . . . not
enough stress has been laid upon the inequitable character of the defendants’ conduct in making a use of such process that was inimical to the complainant’s interests.”110 The court grounded its decision in commercial
ethics: “[T]he secrecy with which a court of equity deals is not necessarily
that absolute secrecy that inheres in discovery, but that qualified secrecy that
arises from mutual understanding, and that is required alike by good faith
and by good morals.”111
The first explicit nexus between trade secret misappropriation doctrine
and the term “commercial morality” appeared not in the caselaw but in the
Restatement of Torts, published by the American Law Institute (ALI) in
1938–1939. In the early twentieth century, trade secret law was sparse and
was entirely judge-made law that fell under the greater umbrella of unfair
competition law.112 Unfair competition law, in turn, was an embryonic and
underdeveloped area of the law.113 The drafters of the Restatement noted the
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 67 A. 339, 343 (N.J. 1907). The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals was the
highest court of the state until 1947, when it was replaced by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. See STATE OF N.J., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION 21 (1942).
111 Vulcan Detinning Co., 67 A. at 343.
112 See generally JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR TRADE INCLUDING TRADE-MARKS,
TRADE SECRETS, AND GOOD-WILL (1900); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR BUSINESS COMPETITION (1909). See also Note, Basis of Jurisdiction for the Protection of Trade Secrets, 19
COLUM. L. REV. 233, 236–39 (1919). This characterization persisted well into the midtwentieth century. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 95, §§ 6–11.
113 In his leading treatise on unfair competition, for example, Nims devoted his first
chapter to the surprisingly thorny question of “What is unfair competition?” While past
commentators might have viewed unfair competition as a way to limit acts against owners
of trademark or trade names, the more correct and modern view, he argued, was to recognize that “[a]ll acts done in business competition are either fair or fraudulent, equitable or
inequitable,” and that the true goal should be to promote “full protection to every
merchant against unfair business methods.” NIMS, supra note 112, at 3. Unfair acts, he
asserted, included not only trademark infringement or passing off, but any other act that
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doctrinal relationship between liability rules for unfair trade practices and
tort law principles,114 and thus included chapters to deal specifically with
interference with business relations, which included trade secret
misappropriation.115
Specifically, section 757, found in chapter 36 of the Restatement, stated
that liability attaches, inter alia, where one discloses or uses a trade secret
discovered by “improper means.”116 Comment (f) further explained that
improper means included not only illegal acts, such as theft, but also acts
such as “fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage.”117 While the drafters
found it impossible to list all types of improper means, they noted that “[i]n
general[,] they are means which fall below the generally accepted standards
of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.”118
Comment (f) to section 757 went on to refer readers to comment (c) to
section 759. Section 759 addressed procurement of information (which
need not be a trade secret) by improper means.119 Comment (c) provided
that among the means which are “improper” are “theft, trespass, bribing or
otherwise inducing employees or others to reveal the information in breach
of duty, fraudulent misrepresentations, threats of harm by unlawful conduct,
wiretapping, procuring one’s own employees or agents to become employees
of the other for purposes of espionage, and so forth.”120
The discussion in the Restatement of Torts of commercial morality, though
brief, has had significant impact on the development of trade secret law and
the concept of “improper means” of access. The Introductory Note to chapter 35 explained that chapters 35 and 36 dealt with how tort law protected
the interests of businesspersons from “invasion by the trade practices” of
other businesspersons.121 The chapters attempted to balance “the conflict
between the desire for competition and the desire for the security of the
enabled an actor “to purloin his rival’s trade,” including the “fraudulent use” of a trade
secret. Id. at 2.
114 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 35 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1938). The drafters
rejected the term “unfair competition,” noting that the phrase “trade practices” is more
accurate than “competition,” as it encompasses not only harm caused by those who compete directly, but also harm by those whose trade activities injure those in a different business. Id.
115 Id. ch. 35 (1938); id. ch. 36 (1939).
116 Id. § 757(a) (1939). Other grounds for imposing liability are breaching of confidence, id. § 757(b); learning of a secret from a third party with notice that that party had
discovered it through improper means or disclosed it through a breach of confidence, id.
§ 757(c); or learning of the secret with notice that it was a secret and had been disclosed by
mistake, id. § 757(d).
117 Id. § 757 cmt. f.
118 Id.
119 Id. § 759 cmt. b.
120 Id. § 759 cmt. c. Section 759 imposes liability for procuring business information
through improper means “for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest,” id. § 759,
and is not limited to trade secret information, id. § 759 cmt. b.
121 Id. ch. 35 intro. note (1938).
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fruits of individual enterprise so as to achieve the maximum of desirable benefits for both.”122 Thus, the drafters noted, in this area, equitable relief, not
damages, predominated and liability was “constantly expanding,” as a result
of both “the flexibility and breadth of equitable relief” and “changing methods of business and changing standards of commercial morality.”123
However, the Introductory Note cautioned, chapters 35 and 36 could
not list all of the trade practices that would “fall below accepted standards of
commercial morality or which may generally be deemed unfair,”124 in part
because commercial morality standards differed among industries.125 In so
stating, the drafters of the Restatement captured the sentiment of contemporaneous courts, which likewise were struggling with how to define the parameters of acceptable business behavior. For example, a 1933 Supreme Court of
California opinion stated:
No fixed standard or code of business ethics has been adopted by the business world limiting or defining the extent to which business rivals may go in
the employment of artifice, cunning, or what are known as the “tricks of the
trade” or business craft in drawing trade from one to another.126

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a 1932 case, also discussed the limitations of the law in addressing unethical business behavior. The court granted
an injunction that prohibited the defendant from passing off its product as
that of the plaintiff, but declined to issue an injunction restraining the defendant from selling its product to dealers who sold the plaintiff’s product.127
The court noted that “[t]he lack of business ethics displayed by defendant . . .
invites and receives the condemnation of all who love fair play and scorn
chicane and deceit.”128 However, the court went on to say, “there is much
that is unethical that is not enjoinable.”129 Thus, the court concluded, the
solution lay not in the law, but in the hopes for a kind of commercial karma:
Until people do become more civilized and ethical in their dealings, we
will—when finding no legal curb for particularly offensive forms of selfishness in business dealings, such as presented here—have to content ourselves
with the well-supported thought that in the long run such selfishness has
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Fid. Appraisal Co. v. Fed. Appraisal Co., 18 P.2d 950, 953 (Cal. 1933). Similarly, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed the limitations of defining prohibited
acts under the Federal Trade Commission Act in a 1933 case: “Practices which tend to
hinder competition or create monopoly are against public policy just as practices which are
characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression are against good morals; but
not all practices which are opposed to good morals or public policy amount to unfair
methods of competition within the meaning of the . . . Act.” R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc. v.
FTC, 63 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1933).
127 Phila. Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 159 A. 3, 5–6 (Pa. 1932).
128 Id. at 6.
129 Id.
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within it the seeds of its own undoing, and that abiding success in the business world as elsewhere is built on correct moral principles.130

A 1941 federal trial court decision, issued just two years after the Restatement,
also highlighted the uncertain state of the law: “It cannot be doubted that
defendants’ activity is injurious to plaintiff’s business. The question is
whether the injury is of the kind which, in a relatively free economy, the
plaintiff is obliged to suffer. Is it akin to lawful competition of which plaintiff
cannot complain?”131 The court concluded: “The line of demarcation is not
always distinct and may vary from generation to generation as standards of
business ethics move up and down.”132
Perhaps the most significant and enduring impact of the Restatement of
Torts on the application of commercial morality standards to trade secret law
came from what was little more than a quick aside by the drafters. In discussing the difficulty of defining unfair trade practices, the Introductory Note
concluded: “But the tendency of the law, both legislative and common, has been in
the direction of enforcing increasingly higher standards of fairness or commercial
morality in trade. The tendency still persists.”133 This unsupported assertion has
been oft-quoted by the courts over the past eighty years, in trade secret,134
unfair competition,135 and trademark infringement cases.136 The courts
rarely offered support for the continuing vitality of this aged assertion,137
130 Id.
131 Phila. Rec. Co. v. Leopold, 40 F. Supp. 346, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The plaintiff ran a
daily puzzle contest in its newspaper in order to increase circulation. The defendant sold
solutions to the puzzles, and the plaintiff sought, and was granted, a temporary injunction
to halt the defendant’s interference with its marketing effort. Id.
132 Id.
133 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 35 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1938) (emphasis
added). Indeed, the Christopher court itself relied upon substantially similar language in
reaching its outcome (although it failed to cite to the Restatement in doing do). E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Hyde
Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958)). The court in Hyde Corp. cited to the
Restatement directly. Hyde Corp., 314 S.W.2d at 775 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
ch. 35 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1938)).
134 See, e.g., Hyde Corp., 314 S.W.2d at 775; HX in Bos., LLC v. Berggren, 23 Mass. L.
Rptr. 545, 545 (Super. Ct. 2008); Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804,
808 (Mass. 1976); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 200 N.E.2d 615, 616–17 (Ill. App. Ct.
1964); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Am. Marking Corp., 114 A.2d 438, 442 (N.J. 1955).
135 See, e.g., Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600 (D.N.J. 2000);
Car-Freshner Corp. v. Marlenn Prods. Co., 183 F. Supp. 20, 46 (D. Md. 1960); R.M. Palmer
Co. v. Luden’s, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 672, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Edmondson Vill. Theatre, Inc.
v. Einbinder, 116 A.2d 377, 380 (Md. 1955); Ivan’s Tire Serv. Store, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 517 P.2d 229, 237 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
136 See, e.g., A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 198 F. Supp.
822, 826 (D. Del. 1961); Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Premier Packing Co., 140 F. Supp. 328,
332 (D. Mass. 1956).
137 The few that did offer some context for the phrase did so on very limited grounds.
See Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912, 918 (Or. 1962) (stating “cases adopting the higher
standard of ‘commercial morality’ emphasize the breach of the confidence reposed in the
defendant, rather than the existence of the trade secret”); People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat’l Rsch
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however, and even today courts continued to recite this passage without analysis or explanation and apparently without contemplating whether a trend
that was supposedly unfolding several decades ago remains germane
today.138 As will be discussed below,139 this rote recitation of the Restatement
language has had a very real impact on doctrinal development, as it has enabled the courts to elide their analysis of underlying doctrine and simply fall
back on a catchphrase that implies that the imposition of liability is justified,
if not inevitable.140
It is upon these scant references in the Restatement that the scaffold of
modern commercial morality doctrine in the trade secret arena was built.
The development of this doctrine was slow, however.141 Despite appearing
in other types of commercial cases in this time period,142 the term “commercial morality” did not appear in a published trade secret court opinion until
fifteen years after the publication of the Restatement, in Franke v. Wiltschek,
Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (referencing legislation and caselaw in
California that evidenced this trend).
138 See, e.g., Innovasystems, Inc. v. Proveris Sci. Corp., No. 13-05077, 2014 WL 3887746,
at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2014) (unfair competition case); HX in Bos., LLC, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. at
545 (trade secret case); Tullett Prebon PLC v. BGC Partners, Inc., No. HUD-L-3796-11,
2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 728, at *41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. March 31, 2015)
(unfair competition case).
139 See infra notes 296–301 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Vitro Corp. of Am. v. Hall Chem. Co., 254 F.2d 787, 794 (6th Cir 1958);
Peerless Oakland Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 23 Cal. Rptr. 105, 107 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Am. Marking Corp., 114 A.2d 438, 442 (N.J. 1955); Hyde
Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 775 (Tex. 1958).
141 “Improper means” of accessing trade secrets received little attention from commentators and courts in the decades following the adoption of the Restatement. Ridsdale Ellis,
for example, published a treatise on trade secrets in 1953 in which “improper means” of
accessing trade secrets were not discussed while more narrow topics such as trade secret
protection of customer lists and credit ratings, see ELLIS, supra note 95, at 66–82, internal
operating data, see id. ch. 14, and design of goods, see id. ch. 16, received detailed attention.
A Lexis Advance search for “trade secret!” and “improper means” in all federal and state cases
between January 1, 1939, and December 31, 1952, conducted on February 2, 2020, yielded
just ten cases.
142 A Lexis Advance search for “commercial morality” in all federal and state cases
between January 1, 1939, and December 31, 1952, run on February 2, 2020, resulted in
eight cases: J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir. 1941)
(unfair competition/palming off); In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 31 F. Supp. 923, 923
(E.D.N.Y. 1940) (debtor-creditor relations); Lininger v. Desert Lodge, 160 P.2d 761, 761
(Ariz. 1945) (trade name infringement); Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe,
Inc., 46 N.E.2d 165, 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) (trade name infringement); Kay Jewelry Co. v.
Kapiloff, 49 S.E.2d 19, 20 (Ga. 1948) (unfair competition/trademark infringement); Am.
Shops, Inc. v. Am. Fashion Shops of J. Square, Inc., 80 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1951) (trade name infringement); Buck v. Broadway Trinity Place Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d
662, 664 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (contract); H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 123 P.2d 196, 197
(Or. 1942) (trademark and trade name infringement).
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decided by the Second Circuit in 1953.143 The defendants had gained access
to the plaintiffs’ process for manufacturing woven fiber compressed cotton
bath sponges by misrepresenting their willingness and capacity to act as sales
agents for the plaintiffs.144 Having acquired the necessary secret information, the defendants then declined to act as sales agents but instead copied
and marketed a competing product.145 Because the defendants had gained
the information through breach of a confidential relationship, the trial court
ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief.146 The appellate court upheld
the lower court’s finding.147
The Franke court turned to the Restatement’s language about the trend
toward “increasingly higher standards of . . . commercial morality in trade” to
bolster its decision.148 Two cases decided just months prior to Franke had
invoked this already-somewhat-dated language—a Third Circuit case involving trademark infringement149 and a Ninth Circuit case involving trademark
infringement and unfair competition.150 The Franke court cited these cases
when invoking the Restatement’s language as a reason to impose liability upon
the defendants for misappropriation, explicitly stating that it declined “to
attempt to reverse the trend” in the instant case.151 Yet the court provided
no evidence of such a trend, other than the Restatement’s bald assertion and a
couple of citations of that assertion by other courts.
Franke was typical in the sense that far more misappropriation cases present breaches of confidential relationships than improper means involving
outsiders, both then and now. Modern studies show that the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information by current or former employees or
business partners is the most common type of alleged trade secret misappropriation;152 review of the commercial morality cases of this initial time period
143 209 F.2d 493, 499–500 (2d Cir. 1953). The case arose on diversity jurisdiction; the
court saw no need to specify whether the law of New Jersey, Massachusetts, or New York
would apply as the legal rule was the same in all three instances: misuse of secret information acquired by a defendant in the context of a confidential relationship results in liability. Id. at 494–95.
144 Id. at 494.
145 Id.
146 Franke v. Wiltschek, 115 F. Supp. 28, 30–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
147 Franke, 209 F.2d at 499–500.
148 Id.
149 Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 1953).
150 Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Lab’ys., 207 F.2d 190, 193, 196 n.17
(9th Cir. 1953) (citing Q-Tips, 206 F.2d at 145).
151 Franke, 209 F.2d at 500.
152 See David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum
& Jill Weader, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV.
57, 69 (2010) (showing that in 93% of state cases and 90% of federal cases the alleged
misappropriator was an employee or business partner). In a survey of 404 senior executives, 32% of the respondents said they most feared having trade secrets stolen by former
employees, followed by suppliers, consultants and other third parties (28%), and current
employees (20%). Just 20% said they most feared rogue or state-sponsored cybercriminals
or hackers. BAKER MCKENZIE, EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INV. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, THE
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reflect the same. The twenty-one trade secret opinions that referenced “commercial morality” in the seventeen years between the decision in Franke in
1953 and the decision in Christopher in 1970 invariably addressed breaches of
duties owed between parties in special or fiduciary relationships,153 almost all
of them involving current or former employees who improperly disclosed a
trade secret owned by the employer.154 Commercial morality concerns were
inextricably intertwined with emerging employment law doctrine.
Thus, during this early time period when trade secret misappropriation
doctrine was still in its childhood, commercial morality was often invoked as a
way to balance the needs of individuals to make a living against the needs of
employers to protect proprietary information. The New Jersey Supreme
Court provided a succinct statement of the policy trade-offs at stake in Sun
Dial Corp. v. Rideout: On the one hand, public policy should encourage
employees’ “unfettered right” to resign for better employment elsewhere or
to form a business of their own, taking their general knowledge and skills
BOARD ULTIMATUM: PROTECT AND PRESERVE 7 (Duncan Kerr ed., 2017), https://www.baker
mckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/trade-secrets.
153 A Lexis Advance search for “trade secret!” and “commercial morality” in all federal and
state cases between December 9, 1953, and July 20, 1980, run on February 2, 2020, revealed
twenty-three cases, including Franke and Christopher. All but Christopher involve breaches of
duties owed between parties in special or fiduciary relationships. In chronological order,
from oldest case to newest, they are as follows: Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 494 (2d
Cir. 1953); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 108 A.2d 442, 444 (N.J. 1954); Adolph Gottscho, Inc.
v. Am. Marking Corp., 114 A.2d 438, 438 (N.J. 1955); Gallowhur Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 117 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1955); Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 229
F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1956); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. 1958);
Vitro Corp. v. Hall Chem. Co., 254 F.2d 787, 789 (6th Cir. 1958); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika,
144 A.2d 306, 307 (Conn. 1958); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp.
250, 254 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 185 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D.N.J.
1960); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 270 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961); Peerless Oakland Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 23 Cal. Rptr. 105, 106 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912, 914 (Or. 1962); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. BellMark Corp., 191 A.2d 67, 73 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1963); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 200 N.E.2d
615, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 551 (D.
Conn. 1964); Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 772 (Pa.
1965); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 647
(E.D. Mich. 1966); Abbott Lab’ys. v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Wis. 1967);
Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1968); GTI Corp. v.
Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 765 (S.D. Ohio 1969); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
154 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 255 F. Supp. at 647; Sperry Rand Corp., 241 F. Supp. at
551; Peerless Oakland Laundry Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. at 106; Allen Mfg. Co., 144 A.2d at 307;
Schulenburg, 200 N.E.2d at 616; Sun Dial Corp., 108 A.2d at 444; B.F. Goodrich Co., 192
N.E.2d 99, 101; Abbott Lab’ys, 147 N.W.2d at 531. A few cases raised other types of confidential relationships. See, e.g., Aerosonic Corp., 402 F.2d at 226 (former officer and director
of plaintiff); Protexol Corp., 229 F.2d at 636 (licensee of plaintiff); Kamin, 374 P.2d at 914
(independent contractors of plaintiff); Hyde Corp., 314 S.W.2d at 766 (licensee of plaintiff).
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with them.155 On the other hand, public policy must “protect employers
against improper disclosures of information which their employees have
received in confidence.”156 This latter concern, the Sun Dial Corp. court
stated, was perhaps getting heightened attention “in the light of the marked
changes in the attitude of the law towards the need for commercial morality.”157 The trial court in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp. conceived of this balancing as a “spectrum,”
anchored at one end by the employee’s right to change jobs at will and to use
“his general skill, knowledge and experience” in that new job, and at the
other by “the law of unfair competition, including trade secrets law, in which
the courts seek to enforce increasingly high standards of fairness or commercial morality and to protect the owner of information obtained through the
ingenuity and effort of its employees, and its expenditures of time and
money.”158
The employees in Sun Dial Corp. had not signed an express confidentiality agreement,159 but the court found that immaterial, as the employees’
“wrongful conduct in violating the [employer’s] confidence” formed the
basis for liability.160 By contrast, the employees in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein had signed an express confidentiality agreement.161 The existence of the
express agreement did not change the trial court’s view of the underlying
policy considerations. The court found liable former employees who had
formed a competing business, enticed fellow employees to join the new company, and used the former employer’s semiconductor trade secrets in violation of their employment agreements.162 While the court acknowledged the
rights of the former employees to use their general knowledge and skills in
employment or business elsewhere, their calculated attempts to compete
against their former employer by taking and using the employer’s trade
secrets and soliciting key coworkers to decamp would, if allowed by the court,
“make a shambles” out of the employer’s business, a matter that appeared to
be “of little concern” to the defendants except to the extent it would further
155 Sun Dial Corp., 108 A.2d at 447.
156 Id.
157 Id. (citing ELLIS , supra note 95, at 14); see also Allen Mfg. Co., 144 A.2d at 310 (quoting Sun Dial Corp., 108 A.2d at 447). For a thorough analysis of doctrine permitting
employees to use general knowledge and skills in new employment, see generally Camilla
A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Paradox, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2409 (2019).
158 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 255 F. Supp. at 652–53; see also GTI Corp., 309 F. Supp. at 768
(quoting the Allis-Chalmers court’s “spectrum” language); Abbott Lab’ys, 147 N.W.2d at
532–34 (citing Julian O. von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. REV. 583,
583–84 (1961)) (noting the mobility of key employees in industrial concerns is a particular
flashpoint in trade secret doctrine, and acknowledging the difficulty of balancing
employee and employer interests in this setting).
159 Sun Dial Corp., 108 A.2d at 446.
160 Id.
161 241 F. Supp. 549, 554 (D. Conn. 1964). The court had diversity jurisdiction and
decided the claim under Connecticut law. Id. at 559.
162 See id. at 565.
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their own new business.163 This attitude, the court concluded, had “a bearing on the degree to which the defendants violated business ethics and
morality.”164
Commercial morality did not always tilt the scales toward the trade secret
owner, however. A 1956 Second Circuit opinion, for example,165 addressed
an agreement in which the plaintiff disclosed the proportions of its formula
to the defendant in return for royalties and a promise of secrecy.166 When
the defendant filed a patent for its own product using somewhat similar components but in different proportions,167 the plaintiff claimed an improper
disclosure by the defendant. The court reluctantly rejected the plaintiff’s
claim, despite noting both the defendant’s “moral bond” to maintain secrecy
and the Restatement’s call for ever-increasing commercial morality.168 While
the court acknowledged “the sound principle of law that the fruits of a confidential disclosure must not be used or disclosed in breach” of the promise of
confidentiality,169 it nonetheless could not create a rule that would prohibit a
party in the defendant’s situation from experimenting: “Such a result is not
only unnecessary for the promotion of business morality, but offensive to the
sound policy of promoting technical progress.”170
During this initial phase, commercial morality was also closely linked to
injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation. Courts had long had the
power to enjoin misappropriation,171 but now courts invoked commercial
morality to justify such relief; in each such instance the language of the
Restatement was key. Thus, for example, in Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, decided in
1958, the Supreme Court of Texas noted that while injunctions were normally intended to be “corrective,” not “punitive,”172 the “undoubted tendency of the law” toward increasing standards of commercial morality
dictated that when a choice must be made, protection of the trade secret
owner’s legal right should be prioritized over any concerns of punitive effects
upon the misappropriator.173 The role of commercial morality in calculat163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 229 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1956) (citations omitted).
166 Id. at 636.
167 The court found that “the new formula possesses chemical and physical properties
different from the one revealed in confidence and that the new substance is not the
equivalent of the old.” Id. at 637.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Barton, supra note 91, at 551–53 (discussing the use of injunctions in the trade
secret misappropriation context).
172 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958).
173 Id.; see also Peerless Oakland Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 23 Cal. Rptr. 105, 107 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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ing and justifying injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation has
grown since then.174
In short, the first wave of “commercial morality” trade secret cases, postRestatement and pre-Christopher, reflect the attempts of courts to sort out the
vocabulary and boundaries of trade secret misappropriation doctrine and its
liability rules, in particular the delicate balance between employer and
employee interests. The courts of this era struggled with drawing the appropriate lines between behavior that trade secret law would countenance and
that which was beyond the bounds of moral trade practices. Throughout this
timespan, however, commercial morality concepts played an increasingly
larger role in the emerging body of trade secret law such that by 1967, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin confidently stated: “The law concerning trade
secrecy developed as common law. The basis of the doctrine is an attempt to
enforce morality in business.”175 The stage was thus set for the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in Christopher in 1970.
B. 1971–1979: From Christopher to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
The second wave of “commercial morality” cases in the trade secret setting began with Christopher in 1970 and ended with the adoption of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and introduction of the UTSA in 1979. Christopher
was, of course, a watershed decision: it not only provided a fuller discussion
of the role of commercial morality in trade secret doctrine than had been
seen to date, it did so in the context of facts that were at once spectacular and
disquieting. The combination of these two features cemented the case in the
annals of trade secret doctrine. Yet, the case had no noticeable immediate
impact upon the development of commercial morality doctrine in trade
secret misappropriation law. During the first decade following its issuance, a
mere seven trade secret opinions used the term “commercial morality”176
and none of those seven cited Christopher.177
Several of these cases focused on the role of commercial morality in
determining the availability and measurement of injunctions.178 The Illinois
Supreme Court helped flesh out the relationship between commercial morality and injunctive relief when it ruled that commercial morality dictated that
the appropriate length of a permanent injunction was “no longer than that
174 See infra notes 227–34 and accompanying text.
175 Abbott Lab’ys v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Wis. 1967).
176 A Lexis Advance search for “commercial morality” and “trade secret!” in all federal and
state cases between July 20, 1970, and December 31, 1979, conducted on February 18,
2020, reveals only seven cases other than Christopher.
177 In fact, the Christopher court’s “commercial morality” language would not be cited by
any court until 1982. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1366 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
178 See, e.g., N. Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1060 n.3 (7th Cir. 1973)
(quoting ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d. 393, 398 (Ill. 1971)); Analogic Corp. v. Data
Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (Mass. 1976); Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 387 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); ILG Indus., 273 N.E.2d at 398.
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required to discover or reproduce” the trade secret by legitimate means.179
The Illinois intermediate appellate court explained that “injunctive relief is
in the nature of a civil punishment to preserve ‘commercial morality’ and
that it is not restitution.”180 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that the trend toward increasingly higher standards of commercial
morality permitted a trial court to issue harsher injunctions against defendants who had willfully violated a confidential relationship to exploit another’s
trade secret as compared to more honest competitors.181
However, no case presented the egregiously bad behavior by an outsider
on display in Christopher.182 The closest parallel was College Watercolor Group,
Inc. v. William H. Newbauer, Inc., decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1976.183 Here, the plaintiff company prepared and reproduced
watercolor paintings. The defendants, William Newbauer and his eponymous company, contracted to sell paintings for the plaintiff on a commission
basis.184 When the plaintiff’s production could not keep up with sales, Newbauer brought his financial advisor, Thomas Kelly, to the plaintiff’s plant to
evaluate the production methods and to offer improvement suggestions.
Newbauer learned of the plaintiff’s trade secret techniques at that time.185
Kelly returned a second time with an artist, Frederick Dello, to make more
observations. Newbauer hired Dello as an employee and the two of them
then visited the studio of the plaintiff’s artist and observed his process.186
Newbauer asked the plaintiff’s artist to leave the plaintiff’s employ to work
for him, but the artist refused. Newbauer also asked one of his own employees to spy on the plaintiff, but the spying was not carried out.187 Newbauer
then took fifty-four original paintings from the plaintiff, which he used to
reproduce copies. He passed those copies off as the plaintiff’s product,
including using the plaintiff’s trademark on them.188
Newbauer tried to argue that any trade secrets belonging to the plaintiff
had been lost when the plaintiff revealed them to Newbauer, “a competitor.”189 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected this argument, finding
179 ILG Indus., 273 N.E.2d at 398.
180 Brunswick Corp., 387 N.E.2d at 29.
181 See Analogic Corp., 358 N.E.2d at 808.
182 Like earlier cases, several of these opinions involved alleged misappropriation by
former employees. See, e.g., Analogic Corp., 358 N.E.2d at 806; Brunswick Corp., 387 N.E.2d
at 28; ILG Indus., 273 N.E.2d at 395. But see Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc.,
239 N.W.2d 772 (Neb. 1976) (finding that the lack of a confidential relationship between
the parties to an unsigned contract meant trade secret action must be dismissed); Williams
Press, Inc. v. Flavin, 346 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (finding that the allegedly misappropriated subscriber list was the property of the state, not the plaintiff press company).
183 360 A.2d 200 (Pa. 1976).
184 Id. at 203.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 203–04.
189 Id. at 204.
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that at the time of disclosure the parties were in a mutually beneficial relationship and were not in competition.190 Newbauer then argued that there
was no violation of trust and confidence and that the secret was not obtained
by improper means as discussed in section 757 of the Restatement.191 The trial
court had said that the means were improper because Newbauer had made
misrepresentations to gain access to the plaintiff’s trade secrets; the supreme
court ruled this finding was “not only supported by the evidence; it [was]
inescapable.”192
Finally, Newbauer argued that his acts were not in violation of commercial morality because they were in conformance with “existing standards of
the business community,” an argument the supreme court found “startling.”193 The court acknowledged that “[o]urs is a competitive business system in which it is only natural for one businessman to observe and discover
what the competition is doing.”194 However, the supreme court declined to
“put a stamp of approval on the use of misrepresentations and espionage as
means that fall within the ‘generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct,’ ”195 noting that comment (f) to section
757 of the Restatement explicitly called out industrial espionage and fraudulent misrepresentations intended to induce trade secret disclosure as
improper ways of accessing trade secrets.196
A significant judicial development during this second period did not
involve the use of the term “commercial morality,” yet had undeniable
impact on the development of this aspect of trade secret doctrine. The U.S.
Supreme Court decided Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.197 just four years after
Christopher. In the course of ruling that the federal patent law did not preempt state trade secret protection,198 the Court noted that trade secrets are
protected against disclosure or use through “improper means,” as outlined in
section 757 of the Restatement.199 This, the Court stated, “may include theft,
wiretapping, or even aerial reconnaissance,” citing Christopher.200 The
Kewanee Court used the term “commercial ethics,” however, as opposed to
the term “commercial morality,” stating: “The maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly
stated policies behind trade secret law.”201 Permitting industrial espionage
would not only unnecessarily and improperly increase costs for firms attempt190 Id.
191 Id. at 204–05.
192 Id. at 205.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
198 Id. at 491–92.
199 Id. at 475–76.
200 Id. at 476 & n.5.
201 Id. at 481.
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ing to protect their trade secrets, it would result in “the inevitable cost to the
basic decency of society when one firm steals from another.”202
Interestingly, the Kewanee Court framed the relationship between trade
secret law and commercial behavior as a mirror image of the relationship
articulated by previous courts invoking commercial morality in trade secret
cases. The Kewanee Court adopted a more static notion in which trade secret
doctrine fostered the fundamental norms of “commercial ethics” in the marketplace—and in which those norms seemed somewhat fixed over time.203
By contrast, the preceding trade secret cases seemed to view commercial
morality as a more fluid notion in which morality concerns played an important role in shaping and extending the reach of trade secret law incrementally over time.
We cannot know if the Kewanee Court’s decision to employ the term
“commercial ethics” instead of “commercial morality” was an intentional one
meant to convey some sort of policy choice or analytic significance. However, two lines of cases emerged after Kewanee—one in which the courts
adopted the Kewanee Court’s view of trade secret law serving the policy needs
of commercial ethics,204 and one in which the courts focused on the role of
commercial morality in expanding the reach and protection of trade secret
misappropriation rules.205 The overlap between these two sets of cases is
small.206 The lines of cases are not in conflict; rather, they seem to exist on
two parallel tracks. However, some later cases substituted “commercial
morality” when citing to the “commercial ethics” language of Kewanee, asserting that “[t]rade secret law serves to protect ‘standards of commercial moral-

202 Id. at 487. The Court linked this to “[a] most fundamental human right”—privacy—which it noted “is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made
profitable; the state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is unchallengeable.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
203 See id. at 481.
204 A Lexis Advance search for Kewanee and “commercial ethics” in all state and federal
cases run on February 19, 2020, reveals sixty-four cases referencing both Kewanee and “commercial ethics.”
205 See cases cited infra Sections III.C and III.D.
206 Only nine cases referencing Kewanee and “commercial ethics” also reference morality:
Shapiro v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-02964, 2016 WL 9137526 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2016);
Advanced Fluid Sys. v. Huber, 28 F. Supp. 3d 306 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Ultraflo Corp. v. Pelican
Tank Parts, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d 935 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Metso Mins. Indus., Inc. v.
FLSmidth-Excel LLC., 733 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Wis. 2010); Sentinel Prods. Corp. v. Mobil
Chem. Co., No. 98-11782, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2000); PepsiCo.,
Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94-C-6838, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1995);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc., 788 S.E.2d 237 (Va. 2016); DVD Copy Control
Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003); Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
404 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. 1980).
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ity’ and ‘encourage[ ] invention and innovation.’ ”207 Today, any distinction
that might have existed originally between these two terms is blurred.208
Two significant nonjudicial developments brought this second period to
a close. First, the term “commercial morality” disappeared from Division
Nine of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1979. The Introduction
to Volume 4 noted that four chapters of the first Restatement addressing trade
protection and labor, including chapters 35 and 36,209 were omitted from
the Restatement (Second) because these subjects had become highly specialized,
governed primarily by statute, and “largely divorced from their initial
grounding in the principles of torts.”210 Any restatement of these topics, the
drafters declared, should be done in “separate projects.”211
Second, the UTSA was promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979,212 thus bringing trade secret
law out of pure common law and into the state statutory domain. Section 1
of the UTSA defined “improper means” as including “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy,
or espionage through electronic or other means.”213 The comment to section 1 of the UTSA reiterated the Kewanee Court’s emphasis on the importance of maintaining “standards of commercial ethics” in trade secret law,214
but the UTSA did not use the term “commercial morality.” However, the
comment noted that comment (f) to section 757 of the Restatement of Torts
noted the impossibility of listing all potential forms of improper means, and
went on to cite Christopher in stating that “[i]mproper means could include
otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circumstances; e.g., an
airplane overflight used as aerial reconnaissance to determine the competi207 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting 1 JAGER,
supra note 6, § 31:18) (alteration in original). The PepsiCo court seemed to pick this language up from Brunswick Corp., 404 N.E.2d at 207. The PepsiCo language was cited by
several subsequent courts. See, e.g., Garon Foods, Inc. v. Montieth, No. 13-CV-214, 2013
WL 3338292, at *6 (S.D. Ill. July 2, 2013); Square D Co. v. Van Handel, No. 04-C-775, 2005
WL 2076720, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005); Lam Rsch. Corp. v. Deshmukh, No. C045435FDB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54389, at *9–10 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2005); Drayton
Enters., LLC v. Dunker, No. A3-00-159, 2001 WL 629617, at *4–5 (D.N.D. Jan. 9, 2001).
208 See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1238–39
n.42 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475, 481–82) (“Our analysis is consistent
with the stated purposes of trade secret protection: (1) maintaining commercial morality,
and (2) encouraging innovation.”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D. Mass.
1994) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481) (“The purpose of an injunction in a trade secret
case is to,” inter alia, “reinforce the public policy of commercial morality.”).
209 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS intro. (AM. L. INST. 1979). The other two chapters were chapter 34, addressing the privilege to engage in business, and chapter 38,
addressing labor disputes. See id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, at 238–39 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1979).
213 Id. § 1(1).
214 Id. § 1 cmt.
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tor’s plant layout during construction of the plant.”215 The UTSA proved
popular with state legislatures. By 1990, almost eighty percent of the states
had adopted it;216 today, it has been adopted by all states but two.217
In sum, Christopher had little discernable impact on commercial morality
concerns in trade secret doctrine in its first decade. This decade did see,
however, an increased role for commercial morality in addressing injunctive
relief, and the introduction by the U.S. Supreme Court of an alternate
term—“commercial ethics”—to the trade secret lexicon. As the next Section
discusses, the emphasis on the role of commercial morality in injunctive
relief was a highlight of the third wave of cases, decided over the next fourteen years leading up to the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition.
C. 1980–1994: From the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the Introduction of
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
The third wave of trade secret “commercial morality” cases was decided
in the period after trade secret doctrine had been eliminated from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1980 and before it was reinstated in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition in 1995. Twenty-eight opinions addressing
trade secrets and “commercial morality” were issued in this interval.218
In certain ways, the opinions of this period did not vary from those of
the previous period. Courts continued to cite to section 757 of the first
Restatement,219 including its assertion that the undisputable tendency of the
law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial
morality in the business setting.220 The promulgation of the UTSA had no
impact on applications of commercial morality, which remained firmly
entrenched in common-law trade secret doctrine.221 In other ways, however,
215 Id. (citing E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970)).
216 Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited Sept.
14, 2020). Thirty-five states had adopted it by 1990. Id.
217 The two nonadopters are New York and North Carolina. Id.
218 A Lexis Advance search run on February 24, 2020, for “commercial morality” and
“trade secret!” in all state and federal cases between January 1, 1980, and Dec. 31, 1994,
yielded twenty-eight cases.
219 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1203 (5th Cir.
1986); Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer, No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 7, 1991).
220 They did not always cite to the Restatement when adopting this language. See, e.g.,
Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 791 F. Supp. 1280, 1294 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (quoting Picker
Int’l, Inc. v. Blanton, 756 F. Supp. 971, 983 (N.D. Tex. 1990). Picker International, Inc. in
turn quoted Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958), a case which did
include citations to the Restatement. See also Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc., 1991 WL 155819, at
*3.
221 See Hoyt v. Stahl, No. 91-4030, 1991 WL 174472 (10th Cir. Sept. 9, 1991); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1255 (3d Cir. 1985); Miles Inc. v. Cookson Am.,
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the opinions evidenced a general maturing of trade secret doctrine. For
example, while the bulk of the cases continued to involve allegedly improper
disclosures by employees or former employees,222 or (occasionally) other
types of confidential relationships, the courts no longer discussed the balancing of specific interests between these parties as explicitly as they had in previous years,223 as those rules appeared to have coalesced.
Two noticeable trends did emerge in this period. First, several opinions
clarified that the “commercial morality” and “improper means” language of
the Restatement applied only when the information at issue was indeed a trade
secret and that this threshold determination must be made first before any
discussion of the morality of the defendant’s actions was to occur.224 For
example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that liability could
attach only where the facts evidenced an underlying trade secret, rejecting
the plaintiff’s argument that a defendant’s acts in violation of commercial
morality meant that any doubts about the scope of the underlying trade
secret were to be resolved against the defendant.225 Similarly, a federal trial
court ruled that it was futile to argue that the defendant’s accessing the plaintiff’s trade secrets by going through the plaintiff’s trash was in violation of
commercial morality, where the plaintiff’s actions in placing the information
in unsecured trash in the first place destroyed any trade secrets contained
therein.226 A defendant’s violation of standards of commercial morality
could not substitute for the plaintiff’s initial burden to show the existence of
the trade secret.
Second, injunctions became more closely linked to considerations of
commercial morality. Although the employee-employer relationship
received less attention during this time period,227 the need to balance the
rights of trade secret owners against the economic mobility of individuals
remained a concern in the context of how courts rendered remedies.228
Thus, many of the cases of this period focused on the availability and approInc., No. 12,310, 1994 WL 676761, *8–21 (Del. Ch. 1994); Schumann v. IPCO Hosp. Supply Corp., 418 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
222 See, e.g., Picker Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. at 979; Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 206 (Ill. 1980); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 467 N.E.2d
1271, 1276 (Mass. 1984); Gen. Battery Corp. v. Slaton, 37 Pa. D. & C.3d 459, 467 (Ct.
Comm. Pleas 1984); Shenandoah Studios of Stained Glass, Inc. v. Waters, 27 Va. Cir. 464,
464 (1983).
223 See, e.g., Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1232 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (involving the purchase and sale of a business).
224 See, e.g., Hoyt, 1991 WL 174472; Ecologix, Inc. v. Fansteel, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1374,
1382 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
225 See USM Corp., 467 N.E.2d at 1284 n.17.
226 See Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer, No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 7, 1991).
227 See, e.g., Griff Mach. Prods. Co. v. Griptron Sys., Inc., No. C-84-434, 1985 WL 264325,
at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 1985) (involving a buyer-seller relationship).
228 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995); Brunswick
Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ill. 1980).
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priate structuring of injunctions,229 including preliminary injunctions.230
Injunctions against future misappropriation were seen as serving the public
interest by promoting commercial morality.231 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, for example, explained that its emphasis on commercial
morality dictated the issuance of an injunction as “defendants should not be
permitted a competitive advantage from their avoidance of the normal costs
of invention and duplication.”232 However, other courts noted that while
injunctions promoted commercial morality through their “deterrent
effect,”233 they should not be overly punitive. In the words of the Illinois
Supreme Court, the issuance of a permanent injunction promotes “commercial morality” by punishing the wrongdoer, but if the injunction persists past
the point where the secret is discoverable by others, the injunction subverts
the public interest in promoting competition and the free mobility of
employees.234
D. 1995–2020: The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
to the Present
In 1995, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
accepted the challenge laid down by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1979
and included trade secret law in their remit. The drafters noted that the
meaning of “unfair competition” had expanded beyond its traditional common law meaning of “a competitor’s misrepresentation of the source of
goods or services” to encompass a variety of causes of action involving “methods of competition that improperly interfere with the legitimate commercial
interests of other sellers in the marketplace.”235 This would include, for
example, passing off and deceptive advertising, as well as infringement of
229 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264 (3d Cir. 1985)
(rejecting defendants’ arguments that public policy promoting free competition outweighed the commercial morality interest in issuance of an injunction); Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319, 326 (Mass. 1980); Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v.
Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1231–32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding that the
issuance of an injunction promoted commercial morality). Several courts cited to William
F. Johnson, Jr., Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 1004 (1978), with
regard to the relationship between injunctions and commercial morality. See, e.g., USM
Corp., 467 N.E.2d at 1284; Brunswick Corp., 404 N.E.2d at 207.
230 Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 791 F. Supp. 1280, 1294 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Picker Int’l,
Inc. v. Blanton, 756 F. Supp. 971, 983 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Gen. Battery Corp. v. Slaton, 37 Pa.
D. & C.3d 459, 471–72 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1984).
231 See Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 566 A.2d at 1231.
232 Curtiss-Wright Corp., 407 N.E.2d at 326 (quoting Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation,
358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (Mass. 1976)).
233 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D. Mass. 1994).
234 Brunswick Corp., 404 N.E.2d at 207; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus.,
Inc., No. 84-C-6746, 1993 WL 286484, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1993) (citing Brunswick Corp.,
404 N.E.2d at 207).
235 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
XI–XII (AM. L. INST. 1995).
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trademark, publicity rights, and, most importantly for our purposes, trade
secrets.236
Thus, section 40 of the Restatement (Third) makes a party liable for acquiring a trade secret through “improper” means,237 while section 43 explains
that “improper means” include “theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of confidence, and other means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under
the circumstances of the case.”238 Comment (c) to section 43 notes that it is
impossible to list all conduct that is improper, but that such conduct includes
more than just tortious or criminal violations of a trade owner’s rights,
“including whether the means of acquisition are inconsistent with accepted
principles of public policy.”239
The term “commercial morality” is conspicuously absent in the Restatement (Third). However, illustration 3 in the comments to section 43 is in fact
the Christopher scenario,240 and the Reporter’s Note to section 43 refers to
Christopher with approbation as an “often-cited” case that exemplifies how
“[o]therwise lawful conduct that is wrongful under the circumstances” can
give rise to liability for improper means of accessing a trade secret.241
Sixty-seven opinions have referenced “commercial morality” and “trade
secret” since 1994.242 These cases have worked no radical changes in the
application of commercial morality concepts but rather have resulted in
incremental developments. The courts continue to reiterate that trade secret
law is intended to protect standards of “commercial morality” and encourage
236 Id.
237 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (AM. L. INST. 1995).
238 Id. § 43.
239 Id. § 43 cmt. c.
240 Id. § 43 illus. 3.
241 Id. § 43 Reporter’s Note. Another sea change in American trade secret doctrine
occurred in 1996, when Congress enacted federal trade secret legislation for the first time.
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) provided for criminal remedies for trade secret misappropriation. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839). “Commercial morality” was not referenced, although § 1831 addressed criminal liability for economic espionage. Id. This federal criminal legislation was followed by the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) in
2016, Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), which was patterned after the UTSA to provide a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. Section 1839 was also
then amended to define improper means as having the same definition as in the UTSA,
i.e., as including “espionage,” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (2018) (“the term ‘improper means’ (A)
includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means”), which could be read
as encompassing the type of legal but commercially unethical behavior that was proscribed
by the Christopher court. As it turns out, neither of these Acts has had noticeable impact on
commercial morality doctrine.
242 A Lexis Advance search run on February 26, 2020, for “trade secret!” and “commercial
morality” in all federal and state cases, dated between January 1, 1995, and December 31,
2020, yielded sixty-seven opinions.
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invention and innovation.243 Former employees continue to be the major
source of headaches for trade secret owners,244 yet commercial morality continues to dictate that trade secret rules should not be used to unfairly limit
employee mobility.245
The Restatement of Torts continues to be cited by the courts, despite the
appearance of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.246 The relative
relationship of the two Restatements is not always clear. While many courts
have cited the first Restatement as still-good authority, others seem to have
dismissed it in favor of the Restatement (Third). The Texas Court of Appeals,
for example, ruled that the trial court had not erred in issuing a jury instruction offering the following definition:
“Improper means” are actions that fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct. Improper means of
acquiring another’s trade secrets include theft, fraud, breach of confidence,
and other means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the case.247

The court noted that the second sentence came from the Restatement (Third)
and was correct. The court dismissed the first sentence as “unnecessary” but
“harmless,” without referring to its origination in the first Restatement.248
The Restatement’s hoary assertion of the law’s tendency to enforce
“increasingly higher standards of fairness or commercial morality in trade”249

243 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 2
JAGER, supra note 6, § 31:18); see also Shapiro v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02964, 2016 WL
9137526, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2016).
244 See, e.g., Metso Mins. Indus. v. FLSmidth-Excel LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971 (E.D.
Wis. 2010); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Axis Techs., LLC, 444 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex.
App. 2014); Pocahontas Aerial Spray Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallagher, No. 14-0690, 2015 WL
576161, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015).
245 See, e.g., Drayton Enters., LLC. v. Dunker, No. A3-00-159, 2001 WL 629617, at *4–5
(D.N.D. Jan. 9, 2001) (quoting PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268); Huawei Techs. Co., Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 11-cv-497, 2011 WL 612722, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2011) (same); Square D
Co. v. Van Handel, No. 04-C-775, 2005 WL 2076720, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005)
(same).
246 See, e.g., LivePerson, Inc. v. [24]7.ai, Inc., No. 17-cv-01268, 2018 WL 5849025, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018); Big Vision Priv. Ltd. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 1 F. Supp.
3d 224, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Balance Point Divorce Funding, LLC v. Scrantom, 978 F.
Supp. 2d 341, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ultraflo Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc., 926 F. Supp.
2d 935, 948 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Some courts cited Jager’s treatise on this point instead of the
Restatement. See, e.g., Metso Mins. Indus., 733 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (citing 1 JAGER, supra note 6,
§ 1.03); Garon Foods, Inc. v. Montieth, No. 13-cv-214, 2013 WL 3338292, at *6 (S.D. Ill. July
2, 2013) (citing 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 31:18).
247 Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 411 S.W.3d 581, 607–08 (Tex. Ct. App.
2013).
248 Id. at 608.
249 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 35 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1938).
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continues to be cited by the courts, who often link it to injunctive relief.250
For example, the Texas appellate court explained:
Although an injunction should ordinarily operate as a corrective rather than
a punitive measure, if a choice must be made between the possible punitive
operation of an injunction and the failure to provide adequate protection of
a recognized legal right, we must follow the course that provides adequate
protection because “the undoubted tendency of the law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial morality in the business
world.”251

In fact, most attention seems to fall upon the relationship between commercial morality and the issuance of injunctions. Commercial morality continues to be seen both as an underlying foundation of injunctive relief,252 as
well as a determinant of the proper life of an injunction.253 Courts cite to
the public policy imperatives in protecting commercial morality in support of
injunctions.254 The Ohio intermediate appellate court, for example, channeled Kewanee when it asserted: “Injunctive remedies are an important component of the trade secrets law, because they ‘serve the important purposes
250 This proclamation and other similar language from the Restatement have proven
especially popular recently in cases decided under Texas law. See, e.g., Keurig Dr Pepper
Inc. v. Chenier, No. 4:19-CV-505, 2019 WL 3958154, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2019); AHS
Staffing, LLC v. Quest Staffing Grp., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 856, 874 (E.D. Tex. 2018); A.M.
Castle & Co. v. Byrne, 123 F. Supp. 3d 909, 915 (S.D. Tex. 2015). This language was not
always attributed to its original articulation in the Restatement of Torts, however. See, e.g.,
Myriad Dev., Inc. v. Alltech, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 946, 977 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Duffy v.
Charles Schwab & Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601 (D.N.J. 2000) (applying New Jersey law,
which views trade secret misappropriation as a form of unfair competition); see also Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc., 788 S.E.2d 237, 260 (Va. 2016) (citing UTSA § 1 and
the Restatement). But see Balance Point Divorce Funding, LLC, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 353; HX in
Bos., LLC v. Berggren, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 545, 545 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2008).
251 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Axis Techs., L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2014) (quoting Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958)); see also HX
in Bos., LLC, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. at 545; Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Blanton, 756 F. Supp. 971, 983
(N.D. Tex. 1990).
252 See, e.g., Epic Tech, LLC v. Lara, No. 4:15-CV-01220, 2017 WL 5903331, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 30, 2017); CardiAQ Valve Techs., Inc. v. Neovasc Inc., No. 14-cv-12405, 2016 WL
6465411, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2016); Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, No. 3512, 2010
WL 610725, at *31 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010); Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel
Co., Ltd. No. 09-cv-451, 2010 WL 174315, at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 14, 2010); ClearOne
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chiang, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1281 (D. Utah 2009); Sentinel Prods.
Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *35–36 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2000).
253 See, e.g., Sentinel Prods. Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *35; Stampede Tool
Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Specialized Tech. Res.,
Inc. v. JPS Elastomerics Corp., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 163, 163 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2011).
254 See, e.g., ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (citing SI Handling Sys.,
Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264 (3d Cir. 1985)); Agilent Techs., Inc., 2010 WL 610725, at
*31; Specialized Tech. Res., Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. at 163 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sung, 843 F.
Supp. 776, 778 (D. Mass. 1994)); Contour Design, Inc., 2010 WL 174315, at *4 (citing Gen.
Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. at 778).
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of encouraging innovation and helping to preserve standards of commercial
morality.’ ”255
A few courts have expanded on the relationship between “improper
means” and “commercial morality.”256 For example, the Fourth Circuit
noted in a 2001 case that while the UTSA did not provide an exhaustive list
of improper means of trade secret acquisition, all of the examples it provided
“constitute[d] intentional conduct involving some sort of stealth, deception
or trickery.”257 The court concluded that no improper means were involved
when a defendant was mistakenly provided a copy of the plaintiff’s secret
proposal by a third party as the information had not been labeled confidential and there was no evidence to suggest the defendant used that information.258 The Iowa Court of Appeals emphasized in a 2015 case, however, that
“improper means” need not consist of illegal acts; rather actions that “fall[ ]
below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality or reasonable
conduct” suffice.259
A couple of cases presented facts similar to, but not as egregious as,
those seen in Christopher. First, Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,260
involved a complex set of facts; distilled to their essence, the defendant
accessed the plaintiff’s trade secrets in telephone switching system equipment and software by wrongfully obtaining schematics and manuals provided
by the plaintiff to its customers on the express condition that they not disclose them to third parties.261 The defendant misled a customer into breaching its nondisclosure agreement with the plaintiff by telling an employee of
the customer that the defendant needed to “test” some of the plaintiff’s
equipment; in fact, the defendant intended to unlawfully copy and remove
the plaintiff’s trade secrets during that process.262 The employee so misled,
the Fifth Circuit noted, “was particularly susceptible of being hoodwinked
because of his moonlighting as a consultant” to the defendant.263 The court
ruled that a jury could reasonably find that these actions constituted
255 Litig. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bourgeois, No. 95730, 2011 WL 2270553, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 9, 2011) (quoting Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the
Internet, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1041, 1074).
256 Several courts explicitly cited to Christopher in doing so. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v.
DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 1999); DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 79 (D.D.C. 2007); Pocahontas Aerial Spray Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallagher, No. 140690, 2015 WL 576161, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015); Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy
Lopeno, Ltd., LLP, 421 S.W.3d 198, 213 at *21 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).
257 Sys. 4, Inc. v. Landis & Gyr, Inc., 8 F. App’x 196, 200 (4th Cir. 2001).
258 Id. at 201.
259 Pocahontas Aerial Spray, 2015 WL 576161, at *7 (quoting E.I. duPont deNemours &
Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970)).
260 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
261 Id. at 778.
262 Id. at 785.
263 Id.
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improper means that fell beneath “generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct” as described in Christopher.264
Second, CDI International, Inc. v. Marck involved allegations that a defendant hired an investigator to gain access to the plaintiff’s garbage so as to
steal trade secrets, which included price information, customer lists, and
product development details.265 While ordinarily trade secrets disposed of in
the trash lose their protection (for lack of reasonable security measures), the
plaintiff here alleged that the defendant bribed the plaintiff’s trash hauler to
deliver the plaintiff’s trash to the defendant instead of disposing of it as
instructed. The trial court found this raised a sufficient question about the
commercial morality of the defendant’s actions and whether the defendant
had engaged in improper means of access to the plaintiff’s trade secret to
warrant denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.266
IV. THE MODERN ROLE OF COMMERCIAL MORALITY
TRADE SECRET DOCTRINE

IN

The Christopher court provided what is to date the most eloquent and
fully reasoned analysis of what it means to access a trade secret through
“improper means.” However, Christopher is unique in trade secret jurisprudence. No other case has raised the same type of exceptional facts where the
misappropriation flowed from actions that were neither illegal nor in breach
of contract or a confidential relationship.267 College Watercolor Group, Inc. v.
William H. Newbauer, Inc. came close, with its allegations of attempted
espionage, but ultimately that decision rested on misrepresentations by the
defendant.268 Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc. also involved misrepresentations;269 CDI International, Inc. v. Marck involved allegations of bribery.270 None of this very small set of cases—the closest analogs this study
could identify—posed the inherent unfairness found in Christopher, where
the plaintiff suffered loss of a trade secret because of a genuine inability to
forestall misappropriation by a defendant acting within the literal confines of
the law.
While the extraordinary “improper means” seen in Christopher have yet
to make another appearance in trade secret caselaw, Christopher has nonetheless had a significant, but perhaps subconscious, impact on doctrinal develop264
§ 757
265
266
267

Id. (quoting Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1939))).
No. 04-4837, 2005 WL 146890, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2005).
Id. at *6.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 355 n.6 (2003) (“We have not discovered any cases that are like
Christopher in the sense of finding misappropriation despite the absence of either a breach
of contract or a violation of a common law tort.”).
268 360 A.2d 200, 205 (Pa. 1976), discussed supra notes 183–96 and accompanying text.
269 166 F.3d at 785, discussed supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text.
270 CDI Int’l Inc., 2005 WL 146890, at *6, discussed supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text.
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ment in the trade secret field. Its unusual but compelling facts have given
rise to its “landmark” status among commentators, ensuring that the case
remains an important topic of conversation in trade secret doctrine, albeit
largely outside the judicial realm.
Christopher highlights another important but largely unexplored issue:
the role of “commercial morality” in resolving trade secret disputes. While
Christopher helped shine a spotlight on commercial morality as a constraint
on competitors’ actions in the trade secret arena, it did not create this concept. Rather, commercial morality considerations predated this fifty-year-old
case by a full century in American business caselaw generally, and by more
than a decade in trade secret caselaw specifically. This study’s review of that
history reveals that commercial morality is a cryptic and confounding doctrine, yet commentators and courts have not focused upon explaining this
important trade secret concept. The fluid definition and seemingly haphazard judicial application of commercial morality standards make it difficult to
reconcile and categorize the opinions in which it has been invoked, yet the
power of the doctrine in advancing trade secret law is undeniable. Commercial morality ought not to be abandoned in trade secret law, but its antecedents should be recognized and its meaning explicitly considered before it is
invoked by a court.
The malleability of commercial morality as a doctrine is evident in the
varied ways it has been employed by courts and commentators over time. In
the early years, when trade secret doctrine itself was still maturing, courts
invoked commercial morality as a mechanism both for justifying the existence of trade secret law and for expanding liability notions,271 and as a construct to help balance employer and employee interests in this developing
area of law.272 In that early setting, commercial morality acted as an ethical
constraint in an era when the field of business ethics had yet to emerge;273
i.e., it was a way to evaluate the types of business behavior that were and were
not acceptable in a legal system that had yet to establish consistent boundaries on such behavior. As trade secret law became more settled and accepted
and the balance of rights in the employment relationship more defined,274
these types of analyses became less frequent and commercial morality was
increasingly used to justify or bound injunctive relief.275
271 See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 153–64 and accompanying text.
273 See generally Gabriel Abend, The Origins of Business Ethics in American Universities,
1902–1936, 23 BUS. ETHICS Q. 171 (2013).
274 See, e.g., John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 12–15 (1962) (discussing
early rules regarding protection of trade secrets in employment and other fiduciary relationships). Stedman asserted that an employee may legitimately use “certain confidential
information that he can retain in his memory.” Id. at 8. Modern courts and the UTSA
would disagree. See, e.g., First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp. 3d 819, 844–45
(C.D. Ill. 2014); Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, 881 N.E.2d 850, 855 (Ohio 2008); Pelican Bay Forest Prods. v. W. Timber Prods., Inc., 443 P.3d 651, 659 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
275 See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
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The inherent pliability of the commercial morality doctrine is also evidence of its lack of a solid theoretical foundation. As applied by the courts,
the term “commercial morality” displays no clear theoretical basis and no
comprehensive tenets. Certainly, commercial morality has not been used by
the courts as part of any kind of formal ethical framework. In their important study of the role of ethical theory in trade secret cases, Professors
Wiesner and Cava examined eleven years of trade secret decisions to determine if application of ethical theory could be discerned in judicial decisionmaking.276 Wiesner and Cava concluded “no,”277 stating that although the
courts “espouse ethical intentions,” they “are not overly analytical in their
pursuit of the ethical issue.”278 Their result is unsurprising. Courts are not
trained in deontology or utilitarianism,279 and they have little time or inclination to learn academic theories of business ethics. “Commercial morality,”
especially to early courts, must have meant something much more intuitive
and commonsensical than formal ethical theory. It was a tool, not an
ideology.
What does commercial morality mean in the trade secret setting? The
answer to that question is complicated because commercial morality plays
two roles, both of which serve the courts’ objective in achieving fairness
between the parties but in very different ways. The first—the use of commercial morality as an equitable tool for structuring relief—is congruent with
normal exercises of equitable powers by the courts; the second, where commercial morality can serve as an analytic shortcut for courts seeking to reach
preferred outcomes, is far more troubling.
The courts have long had the power to fashion equitable relief where
legal remedies are insufficient; this power is necessarily flexible, fact dependent, and fluid.280 The exercise of equitable powers for this purpose
exploded between 1865 and 1880, during the height of the American Industrial Revolution.281 Forty percent of the equity cases decided by the federal
judiciary in that timespan involved requests for injunctions in patent, copyright, and trademark cases.282
While trade secret law developed along a somewhat later timeline than
these other forms of intellectual property law,283 the seeds of equitable
injunctive relief against misappropriation of confidential information could
276 See Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 1076,
1076 (1988).
277 Id. at 1128 (finding that “trade secret cases exhibit no major theme of fairness as is
advertised in many judicial opinions”).
278 Id. at 1081.
279 See id. at 1082 (discussing these ethics approaches).
280 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in extraordinary
cases, which are exceptions to general rules.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
281 See Jurisdiction: Equity, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-equity (last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
282 Id.
283 See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
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be seen as early as the 1908 case of Eastern Extracting Co., discussed above.284
In 1938, the Restatement of Torts lauded “the flexibility and breadth of equitable relief” when describing the expanded reach of liability for trade secret
misappropriation.285 By the late 1950s, the courts were increasingly citing
commercial morality when deciding whether and on what terms injunctive
relief was available when trade secret misappropriation had been proven.286
The relationship between commercial morality notions and the availability
and parameters of injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation deepened over the following decades as trade secret law matured;287 today, a significant portion of the trade secret cases in which commercial morality is
mentioned involve deliberations on injunctions.288
The second role of commercial morality in trade secret law relates to the
scope of “improper means” of accessing trade secrets, and rests on more analytically precarious ground. Accessing trade secrets through actions that are
in violation of law, such as theft or trespass, is clearly wrong,289 and could, at
least in theory, be separately pursued through those causes of action. Accessing trade secrets through breach of a contractual obligation to maintain
secrecy or through violation of the implied duty of confidentiality owed by an
employee to the employer arising out of the employment relationship is likewise wrong.290
The Restatement of Torts introduced a third category of “improper
means”—actions falling below “generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct.”291 In so doing, the drafters appeared to
be trying to accommodate the courts’ need to do fairness in cases where
black letter law did not offer sufficient protection to plaintiffs. There was a
certain intuitive appeal to the Restatement’s effort to provide a mechanism for
constraining unseemly business behavior that was contrary to good business
practices and social norms but not actually illegal. Early courts and commentators similarly noted the imperative to draw a line between acceptable and
unacceptable business behavior, and the difficulty of locating the point on
this spectrum in which the line between legitimate and illegitimate actions is
crossed. For example, Wood characterized business behavior as a spectrum
anchored by “the extremes of acknowledged theft and indubitable honesty.”292 The Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. court conceived of a spectrum
with the employee’s right to job mobility and free use of general skills and
284 E. Extracting Co. v. Greater N.Y. Extracting Co., 110 N.Y.S. 738, 741 (App. Div.
1908), discussed supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
285 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 35 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1938).
286 See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1939), discussed
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
290 See 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 6, § 5.02[1] & n.7–8 (citing cases involving an
employer-employee relationship).
291 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1939).
292 WOOD, supra note 61, at 2, discussed supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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knowledge at one end and the employer’s right to protect its confidential
information at the other.293 Both spectrums encompassed a wide range of
behaviors between their clear endpoints. Commercial morality was the fulcrum that determined which way the scale would tip in a given case—and
that fulcrum could shift depending upon the facts of the case before the
court, the court’s own exercise of its equitable discretion, and even unidentified changes in social or commercial norms that dictated that higher standards of behavior should be enforced.
The varied settings and outcomes of early cases indicate that at least initially commercial morality was a blunt instrument used by the courts to sanction business behavior they found distasteful, with little more rationale
behind its application than Justice Stewart’s famed “I know it when I see it”
test.294 Invocation of “generally accepted standards of commercial morality”
provided a palatable (albeit somewhat flimsy) rationale for courts to curtail
unethical business acts and to prevent the courts from being misused as a
tool for inappropriate gain. The most troubling aspect of this application of
commercial morality arose in the context of the Restatement’s 1939 characterization that the law’s tendency is to enforce “increasingly higher standards of
fairness or commercial morality in trade.”295
The Restatement quote has become a self-fulfilling prophecy in trade
secret law, often serving as a bootstrap for courts seeking to reach a desired
outcome.296 A perturbing number of courts have blindly quoted this now
eighty-year-old language without investigating whether it continues to be
accurate—or, indeed, whether it ever was.297 We see similar circular reasoning in other areas of the law,298 and this type of rote recital reflects the weak
underbelly of the doctrine of precedent, where an unsupported assertion can
take on a life of its own through judicial repetition. The problem is not the
courts’ laudable desire to enforce higher standards of fairness and commercial behavior; it is that the courts reach that objective through a form of analytical shorthand that does not require them to explore the rationale behind
their decisions or even acknowledge that they may be making new law in
reaching their results. The Restatement’s broad, aspirational language allows
293 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 653
(E.D. Mich. 1966); see also GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1969)
(quoting Allis-Chalmers “spectrum” language); Abbott Lab’ys v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147
N.W.2d 529, 532–34 (Wis. 1967) (citing von Kalinowski, supra note 158, at 583) (noting the
mobility of key employees in industrial concerns is a particular flashpoint in trade secret
doctrine, and acknowledging the difficulty of balancing employee and employer interests
in this setting).
294 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
295 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 35 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1938).
296 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
298 See Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald, A Serendipitous Experiment in Percolation of
Intellectual Property Doctrine, 95 IND. L.J. 39, 70 (2020) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s discomfort with loose application of precedent in trademark law that resulted in the judicial
creation of a trademark fee-shifting doctrine in the absence of legislative action).
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courts to achieve their intended outcomes without engaging in the kind of
deliberate explication we expect to see in judicial decisionmaking.
Much of the power of the Fifth Circuit’s language in Christopher lies in
the fact that the court did not engage in this kind of lazy reasoning. The
court acknowledged that no law had been violated, no contractual obligation
had been broken, and no duty arising out of a confidential relationship had
been breached.299 Yet, the court also recognized the inherent unfairness in
not protecting an owner whose loss of trade secret was attributable not to the
failure of its own actions in securing its confidential information but rather
to “unanticipated, the undetectable, or . . . unpreventable methods of espionage.”300 The court also explicitly grounded its decision in the public policy
implications of allowing espionage acts that would discourage innovation and
invention.301
Christopher thus provides a sound roadmap for a court invoking commercial morality in “improper means” cases today. The court should carefully
work its way through the analysis. If liability can be grounded in violation of
law or breach of contract or confidential relationship, those grounds should
be cited for liability. If none of those constraints have been contravened, the
court may then turn to commercial morality considerations, carefully avoiding the rote recital of the Restatement’s dated language regarding the tendency of the law toward higher standards of commercial morality. Rather,
the court should follow Christopher’s lead in analyzing those aspects of the
defendant’s behavior that are wrongful, the impact of that behavior upon the
trade secret owner, and the public policy interests being served before invoking commercial morality as a basis for imposing liability.
Under this framework, commercial morality’s application in modern
trade secret law will remain somewhat ad hoc and unpredictable, but that
inherent flexibility reflects its important role in helping courts achieve equity
in rapidly changing legal and technological environments. The commercial
immorality in Christopher was made possible by the combination of airplanes
and photographic equipment that would allow the capture of images that
were adequately shielded at eye level. Today, the commercial immorality
may arise from more technologically sophisticated measures, such as the use
of drones and long-range telephoto lens to sneak pictures through skyscraper
windows, but the principle remains the same. Commercial morality doctrine
provides a much-needed theory for analyzing cutting-edge legal issues in
which courts must address competitive behavior that, while not technically
illegal or in breach of contract, nonetheless is contrary to public policy
imperatives of fair trade and business and societal norms of fair play and
ethical commercial behavior.
299 See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir.
1970).
300 Id. at 1016.
301 See id. (“Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections
required to prevent another’s spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is
dampened.”).
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The problem with the application of the commercial morality doctrine
arises when a court uses this broad and boundless language to justify its holding without explaining its reasoning. If a court invokes commercial morality
justifications casually and without reasoned argument, the term becomes an
empty carapace and not the basis for legitimate and sound judicial
decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
The catalyst for this study was the milestone fiftieth anniversary of the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Christopher. The extraordinary facts and eloquent
reasoning of that opinion have made it a landmark case in trade secret law,
particularly with regard to “improper means” of trade secret access and standards of “commercial morality.” Yet, while Christopher may be a landmark
case, it is also unique, with facts that have yet to be replicated in another
trade secret dispute.
It turns out, though, that the term “commercial morality” has a rich history that predates Christopher and has played an important but shifting role
throughout the development of U.S. trade secret law. This study has filled a
gap in the literature by examining that history and the application of commercial morality doctrine by courts. Despite its ill-defined application by the
courts, commercial morality serves the larger objectives of trade secret law by
enabling courts to exercise fairness between the parties and constrain unethical business behavior that legal rules fail to address. This role could be
enhanced by a clearer judicial articulation of the principles and theory under
this equitable concept, but the value of commercial morality concepts to a
robust trade secret doctrine should not be underestimated.

